The Concern with Politics in Recent Philosophical Thought (TS A)	Concern with Politics in Recent European Political Thought (TS B)	Concern with Politics in Recent European Political Thought (TS C)	Concern with Politics in Recent European Political Thought (TS D)
1
The Concern with Politics in Recent Philosophical Thought1	Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought 1	Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought1	Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought1
2
For the philosopher, concern1 with politics is not a matter of course. When we as political scientists examine2 the political philosophies of the past, we3 tend to overlook that these, with very few exceptions, owe4 their origin to5 a rather6 negative, highly self-protecting and self-defending7 attitude of the philosopher towards8 the polis and that historically therefore9 those centuries prove10 to be richest in political philosophy whose political actuality was11 least propitious or even dangerous to the physical existence of the philosopher and to the essential conditions of philosophizing. The event which,12 with Plato’s political philosophy,13 started our tradition of political thought was the death of Socrates, i.e.15 the condemnation of the philosopher by the polis. The question which has16 haunted political philosophy ever since17 and to which almost as many answers exist as there are18 original political philosophies, is20: how21 can philosophy protect and defend and22 liberate itself from the political realm, which23 are the best political24 conditions (or the25 best form of government) for philosophical activity? The answers to this question27, despite their bewildering28 variety, tend to agree on one point29: Peace is the highest good of the commonwealth whose greatest evil30 is civil war31 and internal strife. What the philosophers first32 of all and almost unanimously demanded of33 the political realm was permanence and security which together would make action in the strict sense of the word,34 (i.e. not as mere35 execution of laws or application of rules, but as37 the beginning of something new whose outcome is unpredictable by definition) almost38 superfluous. Traditionally, political philosophy therefore started with an admitted or unadmitted complaint about39 the unhappy lack40 of autarky in human beings which makes it necessary for them41 to live together, to be social animals, dzôa politika, and ended with the establishment of the “best form of government”, which42 would best suit the needs of the unfortunate human condition of plurality and best enable the philosopher to live undisturbed. by it. Of this quest45, we hardly hear anything in modern times46. One may indeed47 think that it died when Nietzsche in great frankness summed up all the best governments of the48 philosophers in the formula in which the best state is49 the one in which the citizens have least political occupations and worries. In other words50, what we political scientists tend to overlook51 in political philosophy is the large amount of truth in the following observation of Pascal,52 a truth which is perhaps even more valid53 for the rest of the tradition than for Plato and Aristotle to whom he applied it:54	Concern1 with politics is not a matter of course for2 the philosopher. We political scientists3 tend to overlook that most political philosophies have4 their origin in5 a negative and sometimes even hostile7 attitude of the philosopher toward8 the polis and the whole realm of human affairs. Historically,9 those centuries prove10 to be richest in political philosophies which were11 least propitious for philosophizing, so that self-protection as well as outright defense of professional interests have more often than not prompted the philosopher’s concern12 with politics. The event which13 started our tradition of political thought was the trial and14 death of Socrates, the condemnation of the philosopher by the polis. The question which already16 haunted Plato17 and to which almost as many answers have been given as18 original political philosophies exist19, has been20: How21 can philosophy protect and liberate itself from the realm of human affairs and23 are the best conditions (the “25best form of government”26) for philosophical activity? The answers, despite their variety, tend to agree on one point29: Peace is the highest good of the commonwealth, civil war30 is the greatest of all evils31 and permanence is the best criterion for judging forms32 of government. In other words, what33 the philosophers almost unanimously have demanded the political realm was a state of affairs where action, properly speaking,34 (i.e. not execution of laws or application of rules or any other managing activity36, but the beginning of something new whose outcome is unpredictable) would be either altogether38 superfluous or remain the privilege of the few. [gap] Traditional political philosophy, therefore, tends to derive39 the political side40 of human life from the necessity which compels the human animal41 to live together with others, rather than from the human capacity to act, and it tends to a theory about such conditions as42 would best suit the needs of the unfortunate human condition of plurality and best enable the philosopher at least43 to live undisturbed . In modern times45, we hardly hear anything of this age-old quest46. One is tempted to47 think that it died |2 when Nietzsche admitted too frankly what most48 philosophers before him had carefully hidden from49 the multitude50, namely that “politics should be arranged51 in such52 a way that mediocre minds are sufficient53 for it and not everybody needs to be aware of it every day.”1)54	Concern1 with politics is not a matter of course for2 the philosopher. We political scientists3 tend to overlook that most political philosophies have4 their origin in5 a negative and sometimes even hostile7 attitude of the philosopher toward8 the polis and the whole realm of human affairs. Historically,9 those centuries prove10 to be richest in political philosophies which were11 least propitious for philosophizing, so that self-protection as well as outright defense of professional interests have more often than not prompted the philosopher’s concern12 with politics. The event which13 started our tradition of political thought was the trial and14 death of Socrates, the condemnation of the philosopher by the polis. The question which already16 haunted Plato17 and to which almost as many answers have been given since as18 original political philosophies exist19, has been20: How21 can philosophy protect and liberate itself from the realm of human affairs and which23 are the best conditions (the “25best form of government”26) for philosophical activity? The answers, despite their variety, tend to agree on one point29: Peace is the highest good of the commonwealth, civil war30 is the greatest of all evils31 and permanence is the best criterion for judging forms32 of government. In other words, what33 the philosophers almost unanimously have demanded of the political realm was a state of affairs where action, properly speaking34 (i.e. not execution of laws or application of rules or any other managing activity36, but the beginning of something new whose outcome is unpredictable), would be either altogether38 superfluous or remain the privilege of the few. Traditional political philosophy, therefore, tends to derive39 the political side40 of human life from the necessity which compels the human animal41 to live together with others, rather than from the human capacity to act, and it tends to conclude with a theory about such conditions as42 would best suit the needs of the unfortunate human condition of plurality and best enable the philosopher at least43 to live undisturbed by it44. In modern times45, we hardly hear anything of this age-old quest46. One is tempted to47 think that it died when Nietzsche admitted too frankly what most48 philosophers before him had carefully hidden from49 the multitude50, namely that “politics should be arranged51 in such52 a way that mediocre minds are sufficient53 for it and not everybody needs to be aware of it every day.”1)54	Concern1 with politics is not a matter of course for2 the philosopher. We political scientists3 tend to overlook that most political philosophies have4 their origin in5 a negative and sometimes even hostile7 attitude of the philosopher toward8 the polis and the whole realm of human affairs. Historically,9 those centuries proved10 to be richest in political philosophies which were11 least propitious for philosophizing, so that self-protection as well as outright defense of professional interests have more often than not prompted the philosopher’s concern12 with politics. The event which13 started our tradition of political thought was the trial and14 death of Socrates, the condemnation of the philosopher by the polis. The question which already16 haunted Plato17 and to which almost as many answers have been given since as18 original political philosophies exist19, has been20: How21 can philosophy protect and liberate itself from the realm of human affairs and which23 are the best conditions (the “25best form of government”26) for philosophical activity? The answers, despite their variety, tend to agree on these points29: Peace is the highest good of the commonwealth, civil war30 is the greatest of all evils31 and permanence is the best criterion for judging forms32 of government. In other words, what33 the philosophers almost unanimously have demanded of the political realm was a state of affairs where action, properly speaking,34 (i.e. not execution of laws or application of rules or any other managing activity36, but the beginning of something new whose outcome is unpredictable) would be either altogether38 superfluous or remain the privilege of the few. Traditional political philosophy, therefore, tends to derive39 the political side40 of human life from the necessity which compels the human animals41 to live together with others, rather than from the human capacity to act and it tends to conclude with a theoryabout such conditions as42 would best suit the needs of the unfortunate human condition of plurality and best enable the philosopher at least43 to live undisturbed by it44. In modern times45, we hardly hear anything of this age-old quest46. One is tempted to47 think that it died |2 when Nietzsche admitted too frankly what most48 philosophers before him had carefully hidden from49 the multitude50, namely that “politics should be arranged51 in such52 a way that mediocre minds are sufficient53 for it and not everybody needs to be aware of it every day.”1) In other words, we political scientists because of our special interest, tend to overlook the large measure of truth in Pascal’s remark: “We can only think of Plato and Aristotle in grand academic robes. They were honest men, like others, laughing with their friends, and when they diverted themselves with writing the Laws and the Politics, they did it as amusement. That part of their life was the least philosophic and the least serious. ... If they wrote on politics, it was as if laying down rules for a lunatic asylum; if they presented the appearance of speaking of a great matter, it was because they knew that the madmen, to whom they spoke, thought they were kings and emperors. They entered into their principles in order to make their madness as little harmful as possible.”2) Many passages in Plato and Aristotle warning their pupils not to take human affairs too seriously could support this statement, and it may be even more valid for those who came after them. Contemporary political thought, though it cannot compete in articulateness with the past, distinguishes itself from this traditional background in that it recognizes that human affairs pose authentic philosophic problems and that politics is a domain in which genuine philosophic questions arise, and not merely a sphere of life which ought to be ruled by precepts that owe their origin to altogether different experiences. Nobody, as a matter of fact, any longer sincerely believes that all we need is “wise men” and that all they can learn from political events is the “foolishness of the world.” This changed attitude may give rise to the hope for a “new science of politics”3), and this will be all the more welcome as philosophy in the past--though it became, Pascal’s remark notwithstanding, the mother of political as of all other sciences--has frequently shown an unhappy inclination to treat this one of her many children as though it were a stepchild.54
3
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	In other words, we political scientists, because of our special interest, tend to overlook the large of truth in Pascal’s remark[metamark (unknown)]: “We can only think of Plato and Aristotle in grand academic robes. They were honest men, like others, laughing with their friends, and when they the Laws and the Politics, they did it as amusement. That part of their life was the stet3least philosophic and the least serious. ... If they wrote on politics, it was as if they were4 laying down rules for a lunatic asylum; if they appeared to be5 speaking of a matter of6 great importance7 , it was because they [metamark (unknown)]knew that the madmen to whom they spoke thought that9 they were kings and emperors. They [metamark entered into their principles] in order to make their madness as harmless11 as possible.”2) Many passages in Plato and Aristotle warning their pupils not to take human affairs too seriously support this statement, and it may be even more those who came after them.	In other words, we political scientists, because of our special interest, tend to overlook the large measure1 of truth in Pascal’s remark: “We can only think of Plato and Aristotle in grand academic robes. They were honest men, like others, laughing with their friends, and when they diverted themselves with writing2 the Laws and the Politics, they did it as amusement. That part of their life was the least philosophic and the least serious. . . . If they wrote on politics, it was as if laying down rules for a lunatic asylum; if they presented the appearance of5 speaking of a great matter7, it was because they knew that the madmen,8 to whom they spoke, thought9 they were kings and emperors. They entered into their principles10 in order to make their madness as little harmful11 as possible.”2) Many passages in Plato and Aristotle warning their pupils not to take human affairs too seriously could12 support this statement, and it may be even more valid for13 those who came after them.	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]
4
The new concern of the philosophers with politics should be seen against this traditional background, for1 this concern can be taken seriously only if it is neither simply the worry about world affairs of every good citizen or patriot nor the reformulation of some old “wisdom”2 of the past3 which resides on the conviction that all4 that is needed are “wise men” and all that these can learn from political affairs is the “foolishness of the world.” That5 is only to the extent that the philosophers take politics seriously6 can we be expected to take seriously7 the philosophers’ opinion on it. Or, to put it another way, only8 to the extent that philosophers recognize that9 politics poses philosophical problems and is a domain from which genuine philosophical questions arise, as distinguished from a sphere of life which ought to10 be ruled by philosophical precepts that owe their origin to altogether different experiences, can they claim that philosophy is as much11 the mother of political science as it is the mother12 of all other sciences. While it is true that Pascal’s insight notwithstanding philosophy could not but become the mother13 of political science, it is also true that in the past14 it frequently behaved more like15 a step mother16.	Contemporary political thought, though it cannot compete in articulateness with the past, distinguishes itself from1 this traditional background in that it recognizes that human affairs pose authentic philosophic problems and that politics is a domain in genuine philosophic questions , and is not merely a sphere2 of life3 which ought to be ruled by precepts4 that owe their origin to altogether different experiences. Nobody, as a matter of fact, any longer sincerely believes that all we need5 is “wise men” and that all these sages6 can learn from political events is7 the “foolishness of the world.” This changed attitude may give rise8 to a “new science of9 politics”3), and this will10 be all the more welcome as philosophy in the past -- though it became11[metamark , Pascal’s remark notwithstanding,] the mother of political an12 of all other sciences -- has frequently shown as unhappy inclination to treat this one13 of her many children as14 it were15 a stepchild16.	Contemporary political thought, though it cannot compete in articulateness with the past, distinguishes itself from1 this traditional background in that it recognizes that human affairs pose authentic philosophic problems and that politics is a domain in which genuine philosophic questions arise, and not merely a sphere2 of life3 which ought to be ruled by precepts4 that owe their origin to altogether different experiences. Nobody, as a matter of fact, any longer sincerely believes that all we need5 is “wise men” and that all they6 can learn from political events is7 the “foolishness of the world.” This changed attitude may give rise8 to the hope for a “new science of9 politics,”3) and this will10 be all the more welcome as philosophy in the past--though it became, Pascal’s remark notwithstanding,11 the mother of political as12 of all other sciences--has frequently shown an unhappy inclination to treat this one13 of her many children as though14 it were15 a stepchild16.	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]
5
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	x x	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]
6
Like all political philosophies, the present European1 concern with politics can be traced back to disturbing political experiences, notably to3 the experiences of [4two]5 world war and6 the totalitarian regimes. In one respect, these events found philosophy much better prepared than ever before and8 the philosophers much more willing to concede the meaningfulness and relevance of political happenings. The9 modern concept of history, especially in its Hegelian version10, has given11 to human affairs a dignity it never enjoyed in philosophy before. The great fascination which Hegel exerted on the first post-war generation and whic13[gap] came after an almost total eclipse of more than fifty years was largely14 due to philosophy of history which16 enabled the philosopher at the same time17 to see18 meaning and truth19 in events and happenings in20 the political sphere21 and to understand this truth23 as revealing something24 which transcends25 all willed action26 and all intentions27 of the political actor. In other words28, Hegel’s philosophy had somehow for this generation squared the circle29 and solved the one30 decisive problem of all traditional31 political philosophy since the ancients32: how33 to deal philosophically with that realm of Being that owes its origin to man and which therefore |3 as long as one understood by35 truth something which is36 not man-made but revealed38 to human39 senses and40 reason could not be taken fully seriously by the philosopher, but had to be considered in its entirety41 as an instrument42 for the sake of something else. Hegel’s43 solution was to maintain that only44 the single actions owe their origin to man45, but that the continuous story actions and events which46 we know as history reveals in its very process something which transcends the realm of human affairs properly. The role of Hegel even at present47, especially in France where48 the whole younger generation is still under his spell and where everybody is a different kind49 of Hegelian, can be understood only if we keep in mind50 to what an extent the modern age’s central philosophical tenet that we can know only what we have made ourselves clashed with51 the whole body52 of past philosophy53, and that Hegel seemed indeed to have found a54 very ingenious solution to the perplexing need55 to take human affairs philosophically56 seriously without abandoning the traditional concept of truth.	Like all political philosophies, the present concern with politics in Europe2 can be traced back to disturbing political experiences, notably the experiences of two world wars,6 the totalitarian regimes and the dreaded prospects of atomic war7. In one respect these events found philosophy better prepared for and8 the philosophers more willing to acknowledge the relevance of political happenings than they had been in the past. The9 modern concept of History, especially in its Hegelian version10, has given11 to human affairs a dignity it never enjoyed in philosophy before. The great fascination which Hegel exerted on the first post-war generation (12and which13 came after an almost total eclipse of more than fifty years) was14 due to his15 philosophy of history, which16 enabled the philosopher to discover18 meaning in the political realm21 and to understand this meaning23 as an absolute truth24 which transcended25 all willed intentions26 and worked behind the back27 of the political actor. For this generation28, Hegel seemed to have solved once29 and for all the30 decisive problem of political philosophy: How33 to deal philosophically with that realm of Being that owes its origin exclusively34 to man and therefore could not reveal truth as long as35 truth was understood as36 not man-made,37 but given38 to man’s39 senses or40 reason. The ancient and the Christian solution had been to consider this whole realm as essentially instrumental,41 as being there only42 for the sake of something else. This43 solution had been felt unsatisfactory for44 the whole modern age45, whose central philosophical tenet, that46 we can know only what we have made ourselves47, clashed with48 the whole body49 of past philosophy. Hegel’s solution, according50 to which individual actions remain as meaningless as before while the process in its entirety reveals a truth that transcends51 the realm52 of human affairs53, was so54 very ingenious because it opened a way55 to take the historical-political happenings56 seriously,57 without abandoning the traditional concept of truth.	Like all political philosophies, the present concern with politics in Europe2 can be traced back to disturbing political experiences, notably the experiences of two world wars,6 the totalitarian regimes and the dreaded prospects of [metamark |]atomic war7. In one respect these events found philosophy better prepared for and8 the philosophers more willing to acknowledge the relevance of political happenings than they had been in the past. The9 modern concept of History, especially in its Hegelian version10, has given11 to human affairs a dignity it never enjoyed in philosophy before. The great fascination which Hegel exerted on the first post-war generation (12and which13 came after an almost total eclipse of more than fifty years) was14 due to his15 philosophy of history, which16 enabled the philosopher to discover18 meaning in the political realm21 and yet22 to understand this meaning23 as an absolute truth24 which transcended25 all willed intentions26 and worked behind the back27 of the political actor. [metamark (text connection)]For this generation28, Hegel seemed to have solved once29 and for all the30 decisive problem of political philosophy: How33 to deal philosophically with that realm of Being that owes its origin exclusively34 to man and therefore could not reveal truth as long as35 truth was understood as36 not man-made,37 but given38 to man’s39 senses or40 reason. The ancient and the Christian solution had been to consider this whole realm as essentially instrumental,41 as being there only42 for the sake of something else. This43 solution had been felt to be unsatisfactory [metamark |]by44 the [metamark |][metamark ₰] modern age45, whose central philosophical tenet, that46 we can know only what we have made ourselves47, clashed with48 the whole body49 of past philosophy. Hegel’s solution, according50 to which individual actions remain as meaningless as before while the process in its entirety reveals a truth that transcends51 the realm52 of human affairs53, was so54 very ingenious because it opened a way55 to take the historical-political happenings56 seriously,57 without abandoning the traditional concept of truth.	Like all political philosophies, the present concern with politics in Europe2 can be traced back to disturbing political experiences, notably to3 the experiences of two world wars,6 the totalitarian regimes and the dreaded prospects of atomic war7. To a large extent, this concern still follows8 the Hegelian conceptual framework, because it was Hegel who introduced the9 modern concept of History into philosophy10, thereby giving11 to human affairs a dignity it never enjoyed in philosophy before. The great fascination which Hegel exerted on the first post-war generation (12and which13 came after an almost total eclipse of more than fifty years) was14 due to his15 philosophy of history. It16 enabled the philosopher to discover18 meaning in the political realm21 and[metamark (text connection)][metamark (text connection)] yet22 to understand this meaning23 as an absolute truth24 which transcended25 all willed intentions26 and worked behind the back27 of the political actor. For this generation28, Hegel seemed to have solved once29 and for all the30 decisive problem of political philosophy: How33 to deal philosophically with that realm of Being that owes its origin exclusively34 to man and therefore could not reveal truth as long as35 truth was understood as36 not man-made,37 but given38 to man’s39 senses or40 reason. The ancient and the Christian solution had been to consider this whole realm as essentially instrumental,41 as being there only42 for the sake of something else. This43 solution had been felt to be unsatisfactory by44 the modern age45, whose central philosophical tenet, that46 we can know only what we have made ourselves47, clashed with48 the whole body49 of past philosophy. Hegel’s solution, according50 to which individual actions remain as meaningless as before while the process in its entirety reveals a truth that transcends51 the realm52 of human affairs53, was so54 very ingenious because it opened a way55 to take the historical-political happenings56 seriously,57 without abandoning the traditional concept of truth. [metamark (text connection)]Seen from this viewpoint, the modern philosophers’ tendency to talk about history when they are confronted with the task of a political philosophy may well appear as the last in a long series of attempts to dodge the question, attempts which Pascal mentioned so sarcastically and with so much sincere approval and admiration.58
7
Seen from this point of view, the modern philosophers’ tendency to talk about history when they are asked to formulate a political philosophy may well appear as the last in a long series of attempts to dodge the question, attempts which Pascal mentions so sarcastically but also with so much sincere approval and admiration.1 However, this aspect, while it may help2 to explain Hegel’s influence today3, reveals4 only a small5 part of a much more complex situation. The political events of the twentieth century, according6 to a very7 widespread sentiment in Europe, have brought out and made public a deep-rooted crisis of the entire9 civilization including its philosophy and all its traditional concepts, a crisis10 of which the philosophers, at least12 non-academic philosophers such as Nietzsche or Kierkegaard, had been aware before13. In the14 nihilistic aspects of present15 political developments16, which are so very obvious17 in the ideologies of all18 totalitarian movements and their inner conviction not only19 that “20everything is permitted” but that “everything is21 possible”22, that once you make an arbitrary principle23 the guide of a consistent policy, everything goes--24in this contemporary nihilism the philosopher was only too likely25 to detect his own predicaments. The predicaments of modern philosophy26 have become27 a factuality of28 in the modern world. If one reflects on this29 curious coincidence , he sees immediately that he is led one30 decisive step beyond Hegel’s pre-established harmony where philosophy31 and politics get32 reconciled in History without for that matter touching upon the philosopher’s |4 absolute36 privilege to remain38, though now in the disguise of39 the historian whose glance is directed backward, the only one40 to whom truth is revealed. It first of all throws the philosopher41 most effectively out of his ivory tower, by connecting thoughts and events mor[gap] intimately than ever before. This connection, however, is43 not one of causality:44 the question is not45 whether the46 events caused the philoso pher47 to think or whether the48 thoughts of the philosophers were respons ible for certain actions49--as though50 Nietzsche either51 submitted meekly to the52 nihilistic trends of the century53 or, on the contrary, was responsible54 for the rise of nazism. It means rather55 that thought itself become historical56 and that neither the thinking57 philosopher, like Hegel’s backward looking thinker, nor that what he thinks, like Hegel’[gap] modi58 of the Absolute, stand outside history or reveal something whi59[gap] transcends it. This is the meaning of Heidegger’s term “historicity” (Geschichtlichkeit) which in many variations recurs in French existentialism where, however, it usually retains a definite Hegelian flavor. Heidegger himself, in recent years, made an effort to formulate this historicity in ontological terms and thus arrived at an understanding where human history would mean to be sent on one’s way (Geschicklichkeit in the sense of being sent and being willing to take this “sending” upon oneself), so that for him human history would coincide with a history of Being which is revealed in it. The point against Hegel is that not Being, but an ontological history is revealed in the realm of human affairs, and this cannot be an Absolute. In Heidegger’s own words: we left the arrogance of the Absolute behind us. (Wir haben die Arroganz des Unbedingten hinter uns gelassen.) This means in our context, that the philosopher has left behind him the claim to being the “wise man” who knows what is good for human affairs because he disposes of standards, rules and measurements which lie beyond the merely human realm, transcend it and can therefore be valid. Whatever the relationship of the philosopher to the political realm may be, it cannot consist in the wise man’s aloofness from human affairs and in his superior wisdom in laying down the rules for the City of men to which he in a sense himself does not belong. The purely negative result of this attitude, the liquidation of the position of the wise man from the side of the philosopher himself is important in two respects: It makes it possible to re-examine philosophically the realm of politics by drawing on human experiences in this realm itself without precluding them by concepts whose basis of experience lies in an altogether different sphere of life. It explains, on the other hand, why no real political philosophy has as yet been developed from this concept of historicity.🞽 only [gap] not active [gap] [gap] of Hist. not polit. Generally speaking, this seems to be the reason why philosophers today are relatively keen in detecting, interpreting and reacting to general trends of the time, such as the technicalization of the world, the emergence of One World on a planetary scale, the increasing pressure of public opinion upon the individual, the atomization of society etc., i.e. to all those modern problems which one can still see and understand in historical terms; while the more permanent questions of politi[gap] which are specifically philosophic, such as What is Politics? Who is Man as a political Being? what is law? what is Freedom? what is tyranny etc. are hardly ever asked at all.60	Seen from this viewpoint, the modern philosophers’ tendency to talk about history when they are confronted with the task of a political philosophy may well appear as the last in a long series of attempts to dodge the question, attempts which Pascal mentioned so sarcastically and with so much sincere approval and admiration.1 |4 However, this aspect, while it may help2 to explain Hegel’s influence in Germany after the first war and in France after the second war3, discloses4 only a5 part of a much more complex situation. According6 to a widespread sentiment in Europe, twentieth-century political events8 have brought out and made public a deep-rooted crisis of Western9 civilization of which the non-academic philosophers had been aware long before it assumed a political reality13. The14 nihilistic aspects of political movements16, particularly conspicuous17 in totalitarian ideologies (which rest on the assumption19 that everything is possible, thus establishing were indeed so familiar to23 the philosopher that he could easily detect24 in them his own predicaments. What attracts modern philosophy25 to the political realm is that its theoretical predicaments26 have assumed27 a tangible reality28 in the modern world. This29 curious coincidence leads to a30 decisive step beyond Hegel’s pre-established harmony where philosophy31 and politics, thought and action, become32 reconciled in History,33 without,34 for that matter,35 touching upon the philosopher’s most cherished36 privilege of being the only one37 to whom truth is revealed. This intimate connection of thoughts and events38, where thoughts seemed to have sensed39 the meaning of events before and not after they had come40 to pass and where events seemed to substantiate and illuminate thoughts, has41 most effectively thrown the philosopher42 out of his ivory tower. At least to the extent that he was willing to recognize that this connection was43 not one of causality and that44 the question of45 whether events caused the philosophers47 to think or whether philosophic48 thoughts were responsible for certain actions was inadequate and essentially futile49 -- as though50 Nietzsche had either51 submitted meekly to nihilistic trends of his time53 or was to blame54 for the rise of nazism. It rather seemed to indicate55 that thought itself is historic56 and that neither the philosopher, like Hegel’s backward looking thinker, nor that what he thinks, like Hegel’s modes58 of the Absolute, stand outside history or reveal something which59 transcends it.	Seen from this viewpoint, the modern philosophers’ tendency to talk about history when they are confronted with the task of a political philosophy may well appear as the last in a long series of attempts to dodge the question, attempts which Pascal mentioned so sarcastically and with so much sincere approval and admiration.1 However, this aspect, while it may kelp2 to explain Hegel’s influence in Germany after the first war and in France after the second war3, discloses4 only part of a much more complex situation. According6 to a widespread sentiment in Europe, twentieth-century political events8 have |3 brought out and made public a deep-rooted crisis of Western9 civilization of which [metamark |]only11 the non-academic philosophers have been aware [metamark |]even before it assumed a political reality13. The14 nihilistic aspects of political movements16, particularly conspicuous17 in totalitarian ideologies (which rest on the assumption19 that everything is possible, thus establishing a pseudo-ontological basis for the earlier nihilistic claim that everything is permitted) were indeed so familiar to23 the philosopher that he could easily detect24 in them his own predicaments. What attracts modern philosophy25 to the political realm is that its theoretical predicaments26 have assumed27 a tangible reality28 in the modern world. This29 curious coincidence leads to a30 decisive step beyond Hegel’s pre-established harmony where philosophy31 and politics, thought and action, become32 reconciled in History,33 without,34 for that matter,35 touching upon the philosopher’s most cherished36 privilege of being the only one37 to whom truth is revealed. This intimate connection[metamark |][metamark ₰] of thoughts and events38, where thoughts seemed to have sensed39 the meaning of events before and not after they had come40 to pass, and where events seemed to substantiate and illuminate thoughts, has41 most effectively thrown the philosopher42 out of his ivory tower. At least to the extent that he was willing to recognize that this connection was43 not one of causality and that44 the question of45 whether events caused the philosophers47 to think or whether philosophic48 thoughts were responsible for certain actions was inadequate and essentially futile49--as [metamark |]futile f.i. as the question of whether50 Nietzsche had51 submitted meekly to nihilistic trends of his time53 or, on the contrary[metamark |], was to blame54 for the rise of nazism. It rather seemed to indicate55 that thought itself is historic56 and that neither the philosopher, like Hegel’s backward looking thinker, nor that what he thinks, like Hegel’s modes58 of the Absolute, stand outside history or reveal something which59 transcends it.	However, this aspect, while it may help2 to explain Hegel’s influence in Germany after the first war and in France after the second war3, discloses4 only part of a much more complex situation. According6 to a widespread sentiment in Europe, twentieth-century political events8 have brought out and made public a deep-rooted crisis of Western9 civilization of which only11 the non-academic philosophers had been aware even before it assumed a political reality13. The14 nihilistic aspects of political movements16, particularly conspicuous17 in totalitarian ideologies [metamark (text connection)](which rest on the assumption19 that everything is possible, thus establishing a pseudo-ontological basis for the earlier nihilistic claim that everything is permitted) were indeed so familiar to23 the philosopher that he could easily detect24 in them his own predicaments. What attracts modern philosophy25 to the political realm is that its theoretical predicaments26 have assumed27 a tangible reality28 in the modern world. This29 curious coincidence leads to a30 decisive step beyond Hegel’s pre-established harmony where philophy31 and politics, thought and action, become32 reconciled in History,33 without,34 for that matter,35 touching upon the philosopher’s most cherished36 privilege of being the only one37 to whom truth is revealed. This intimate connection of thoughts and events38, where thoughts seem to have sensed39 the meaning of events before and not after they had come40 to pass and where events seem to substantiate and illuminate thoughts, has41 most effectively thrown the philosopher42 out of his ivory tower. At least to the extent that he is willing to acknowledge that this connection was43 not one of causality and that44 the question of45 whether events caused the philosophers47 to think or whether philosophic48 thoughts were responsible for certain actions is inadequate and essentially futile49 --as futile as the question of whether for instance50 Nietzsche had51 submitted meekly to nihilistic trends of his time53 or, on the contrary, was to blame54 for the rise of nazism. It rather seems to indicate55 that thought itself is historic56 and that neither the philosopher, like Hegel’s backward looking thinker, nor that what he thinks, like Hegel’s modes58 of the Absolute, stand outside history or reveal something which59 transcends it.
8
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	It is because of such considerations that the term “historicity” (Geschichtlichkeit) began to play its role in German post-war philosophy. From there1 it was introduced into French existentialism,2 where, however, it retains3 a much stronger Hegelian flavor. The true representative of this philosophy remains Heidegger who already in Sein |5 und Zeit (1927) formulated historicity in ontological, as distinguished from anthropological, terms and more recently has arrived at an understanding according to which historicity would mean6 to be sent on one’s way,7 ( Geschicht-lichkeit8 and Geschick-lichkeit are brought9 together in the sense of being sent on one’s way and being willing to take this “sending” upon oneself, so that for him human history would coincide with a history of Being which is revealed in it. The point against Hegel is that no transcendent spirit and no absolute is revealed in this ontological history (Seinsgeschichte); in Heidegger’s own words: “We left the arrogance of all Absolutes behind us” (“Wir haben die Anmassung alles Unbedingten hinter uns gelassen.”4)).12 In our context, this means that the philosopher left behind him the claim to being “wise” and knowing eternal standards for the perishable affairs of the City of men, because he does not really belong to it but dwells in13 the proximity14 of the Absolute. In the context of the spiritual and political crisis of the17 time, it means that the philosopher, after having lost, together with all others, the traditional framework of so-called “values”, does18 not look out for either the re-establishment of the old or the discovery of new “values”.	It is because of such considerations that the term “historicity” (Geschichtlichkeit) began to play its role in German post-war philosophy. From there1 it was introduced into French existentialism,2 where, however, it received3 a much stronger Hegelian flavor. The true representative of this philosophy remains Heidegger who already in Sein und Zeit (1927) formulated historicity in ontological, as distinguished from anthropological, terms and more recently has arrived at an understanding according to which “5historicity” means6 to be sent on one’s way (Geschichtlichkeit8 and Geschick-lichkeit are thought9 together in the sense of being sent on one’s way and being willing to take this “sending” upon oneself)10, so that for him human history would coincide with a history of Being which is revealed in it. The point against Hegel is that no transcendent spirit and no absolute is revealed in this ontological history (Seinsgeschichte); in Heidegger’s own words: “We left the arrogance of all Absolutes behind us” (“Wir haben die Anmassung alles Unbedingten hinter uns gelassen.”4) In our context, this means that the philosopher left behind him the claim to being “wise” and knowing eternal standards for the perishable affairs of the City of men, for such claims to “wisdom” could be justified only by a position outside13 the realm14 of human affairs and be legitimate by virtue of15 the philosopher’s proximity to the16 Absolute. In the context of the spiritual and political crisis of the17 time, it means that the philosopher, after having lost, together with all others, the traditional framework of so-called “values”, will18 not look out for either the re-establishment of the old or the discovery of new “values”.	It is because of such considerations that the term “historicity” (Geschichtlichkeit) began to play its role in German post-war philosophy, rom where1 it was introduced into French existentialism.2 where, however, it retains3 a much stronger Hegelian flavor. The true representative of this aspect of modern4 philosophy remains Heidegger who already in Sein |5 [metamark (text connection)]und Zeit (1927) formulated historicity in ontological, as distinguished[metamark (text connection)] from anthropological, terms and more recently has arrived at an understanding according to which historicity means6 to be sent on one’s way (Geschichtlichkeit8 and Geschick-lichkeit are thought9 together in the sense of being sent on one’s way and being willing to take this “sending” upon oneself)10, so that for him human history would coincide with a history of Being which is revealed in it. The point against Hegel is that a destiny, but11 no transcendent spirit and no absolute is revealed in this ontological history (Seinsgeschichte); in Heidegger’s own words: “We left the arrogance of all Absolutes behind us” (“Wir haben die Anmassung alles Unbedingten hinter uns gelassen.”4)).12 In our context, this means that the philosopher left behind him the claim to being “wise” and knowing eternal standards for the perishable affairs of the City of men he does not really belong to it but dwells in13 the proximity14 of the Absolute. In the context of the spiritual and political crisis of our17 time, it means that the philosopher, after having lost, together with all others, the traditional framework of so-called “values”, do18 not look out for either the re-establishment of the old or the discovery of new “values”.
9
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	The abandonment of the position of “wise man” by the philosopher himself through2 the concept of historicity is important in two respects: First he3 rejection of the claim to wisdom opens the way to a re-examination of the whole realm of politics in the light of elementary human experiences within this realm itself and implicitly discards4 concepts and judgments, which have their roots in altogether different kinds of human5 experience. This reexamination is, second, guided & limited by6 the concept7 of historicity which despite its obvious closeness to the political realm, never reaches its center --8 man as an acting being. Heidegger himself10 has taken11 the first steps on this road when12, in Sein und Zeit, he started the analyses13 of human existence by an extensive phenomenological description of average everyday life15 which does not know solitude but is constantly with and under16 the spell17 of others18. These analyses exerted a certain influence on contemporary sociological inquiries, and rightly so, for they retain their validity even though19 in the categorical opposition20 of the man (21public opinion in the largest sense) against the self, in which public reality has22 the function23 to hide the true realities and to prevent24 the appearance25 of truth, the old hostility26 of the philosopher toward the polis is only too apparent. Much more important27, |6 however, are other limitations the concept28 of historicity itself. Insofar as it originates from a29 coincidence of thought and event (and30 the “event” plays an ever-increasing31 role in Heidegger’s recent publications) ) it can throw new light on history rather32 than on politics, on happenings rather than on action33. This seems to be the reason why this trend in philosophy is highly sensitive34 to general trends35 of the time37, such as38, the technicalization40 of the world41, the emergence43 of One world on44 a planetary scale,45 the increasing pressure46 of society upon47 the individual48 and the concomitant atomization50 of society, etc51. -- i.e.52 to all those53 modern problems which can be best understood in historical terms -- while it seems54 to have forgotten55 altogether the more permanent questions57 of political science, which, in a sense, are more specifically philosophic, such as hat is politics? ho is man as a political being? hat is freedom? etc58.	The abandonment of the position of the1 “wise man” by the philosopher himself is politically perhaps2 the most important and the most fruitful result of the new philosophical concern with politics. The3 rejection of the claim to wisdom opens the way to a re-examination of the whole realm of politics in the light of elementary human experiences within this realm itself and it implicitly discards traditional4 concepts and judgments, which have their roots in altogether different kinds of experience. Such a development naturally does not proceed unequivocally. Thus we find6 the old hostility7 of the philosopher toward the polis in Heidegger’s analyses of average everyday human life in terms of the8 man, the rule of public opinion,9 as opposed to the “self”, in which the public realm10 has the function to hide11 the true realities and to prevent even the appearance of truth.4a) Yet12, these phenomenological descriptions still offer most penetrating insights into one of the basic aspects13 of Society and, moreover, insist that these structures of14 human life are inherent in the human condition as such, from15 which there is no escape into some authenticity which then would be16 the prerogative17 of the philosopher18. Their limitations appear only if they are taken to cover the whole of public life. More important, therefore, are the limitations inherent19 in the concept which is meant to cover the public realm outside20 of the man, outside of society and21 public opinion. It is here that the concept of historicity appears and this concept, despite its new guise and greater articulateness, shares with22 the older concept of history that despite its obvious closeness23 to the political realm, it never reaches, always misses24 the center25 of politics--man as an acting being. The transformation26 of the concept of history into historicity came about through the modern coincidence between thought and event27, and as such is by no means a monopoly28 of Heidgger’s philosophy, but common to all those which are considered here, although the29 coincidence between thought and event comes out clearly only in Heidegger in whose later philosophy30 the “event” plays an increasing31 role. Yet even so, it is obvious that this conceptual framework is better prepared to understand history32 than to lay the groundwork for a new political philosophy33. This seems to be |5 the things of the world which cannot be grasped and judged without being submitted34 to the rule35 of some transcending principle. This impulse is especially strong among those who know36 the problems of modern nihilism best from their experiences with continental37, particularly Central-European38, historicism and do no longer believe with Meinecke that historicism will be able “to heal39 the wounds which it inflicted (on modern man) through the relativization40 of values”.7) Yet41, it is precisely because42 the revival43 of tradition owes its impetus to historicism which taught man to read as he never read before,8) that such44 a large amount of authentic modern philosophy is contained in interpretations of45 the great texts46 of the past. [metamark (text connection)]Quite apart from all commitments as to whether or not47 the breakdown of the authority of tradition is an irrevocable event, these interpretations breathe a directness48 and vitality which is conspicuously absent from49 the many boring histories50 of philosophy produced 50 or 75 years ago51. Those who argue for a return52 to tradition cannot and do not want to escape the53 modern climate, and their interpretations therefore frequently bear the marks of Heidegger’s influence--who was among the first54 to read the old texts with new eyes--although they may reject Heidegger’s own philosophic tenets55 altogether. In any event, this contemporary view of56 the whole extant body57 of past thought is no less startlingly new, no less “deforming” and doing “violence” to reality, if judged by the standards of alexandrinism, than modern art’s view on nature58.	The abandonment of the position of the1 “wise man” by the philosopher himself is politically perhaps2 the most important and the most fruitful result of the new philosophical concern with politics. The3 rejection of the claim to wisdom opens the way to a re-examination of the whole realm of politics in the light of elementary human experiences within this realm itself and it discards implicitly traditional4 concepts and judgments, which have their roots in altogether different kinds of experience. Such a development naturally does not proceed unequivocally. Thus, we find6 the old hostility7 of the philosopher towards the polis in Heidegger’s analyses of average everyday human life in terms of the8 man, the rule of public opinion,9 as opposed to the “self”, in which the public realm10 has the function to hide11 the true realities and to prevent the appearance of truth.4a) Yet12, these phenomenological descriptions still offer most penetrating insights into some basic aspects13 of Society and, moreover, insist that these structures of14 human life are inherent in the human condition as such, from15 which there is no escape into some authenticity which then would be16 the prerogative17 of the philosopher ones18. Their limitations appear only if they are taken to cover the whole of public life. More important, therefore, are the limitations inherent19 in the concept of historicity which is designed to cover the public realm outside20 of the man, outside of society and21 public opinion. For historicity shares with22 the older concept of history that despite its obvious closeness23 to the political realm, it never reaches, always misses24 the center25 of politics--man as an acting being. The transformation26 of the concept of history into historicity came about through the modern coincidence of thought and event27, and as such is by no means a monopoly28 of Heidegger’s philosophy, but common to all those which are considered here,[metamark (text connection)] although this29 coincidence comes out clearly only in Heidegger in whose later philosophy30 the “event” plays an increasing31 role. Yet even so, it is obvious that this conceptual framework is better prepared to understand history32 than to lay the groundwork for a new political philosophy33. This seems to be |6 6 the reason why this school is highly sensitive34 to general trends35 of the time37, such as38, the technicalization40 of the world41, the emergence43 of One world on44 a planetary scale,45 the increasing pressure46 of society upon47 the individual48 and the concomitant atomization50 of society, etc51., i.e.52 to all those53 modern problems which can be best understood in historical terms; while it seems54 to have forgotten55 altogether the more permanent questions57 of political science, which, in a sense, are more specifically philosophic, such as hat is politics? ho is man as a political being? hat is freedom? etc58.
10
It is obvious that the same problem1 can be looked upon2 from the opposite point of view. Nihilism, first sensed and formulated in philosophy and then invadiing and upsetting3 the public-political sphere4 of human living together5, can be seen either as the innermost fate of the modern age which6 can be overcome only in its own terms that, at any rate,7 which sent modern8 man on its way; or, on9 the contrary that which happened when modern man left10 the right path11. |5 This12 is the position not only13 of specifically14 catholic philosophers15, but more generally of all those who have gone back to Christianity16 in an effort to contradict17 the secularization of modern political life19. Against “the worst philosophic chaos which the world has ever seen” (Gilson20) a new21 “science of order” is summoned up whose essence again in many variations23 is the hierarchical subordination24 of the temporal political25 realm to the sphere of the spiritual whereby the spiritual can as well27 be represented by the Church as it can be found in a kind30 of revived Platonism. The justification of the subordination is in any event seen31 in traditional terms: it is either the subordination32 of the means to an end, of34 temporal means to an eternal end, or it is35 the subordination36 of the things37 which need to38 be ordered39 and judged to the rule of transcendent ideas. There is no doubt about the manifold concrete merits of this approach and41 the relevance42 of the writings of men like Maritain and Gilson in France43, Joseph Piper and Guardini in Germany. They have helped to make tradition meaningful again and thereby have revived an almost lost understanding for the significance of the classical as well as44 the permanent problems45 of political philosophy. Moreover, especially in recent years46, they have found a response far beyond those who in one form or another feel committed47 to Christianity, because🞽 event [gap] its irre-vocability. their very blindness for the problem of history and therefore their immunity against Hegelianism has attracted all those who, for altogether different reasons, have found it difficult to continue to think in historical terms and tried to escape48 the nihilistic implications49 of continental historicism. In other words50, all those who no longer hope with Meienecke that historism will be able to heal the wounds which it has inflicted on the modern man’s mind have51 a tendency52 to take their refuge in a revival of tradtion. Curiously enough53, in one54 and in its most fruitful aspect, this revival of55 the tradition owes its impetus to the origins of historism, which taught man56 to read as he never had read before (as Meinecke once pointed out); it certainly is no accident that such a large amount of authentic modern post-Hegelian philosophy is contained in interpretations of the past57. The return to tradition in58 this respect was preceded and still coincides with a59 view of past human masterworks in philosophy and the arts which60 is no less startlingly new and61 no less “deforming” if judged by the standards of mere alexandrinism63 than modern art’s view on nature.	It is obvious that the same problems1 can be looked upon2 from the opposite point of view. Nihilism in terms of historicity is considered to be3 the innermost fate4 of the modern age5, that which sent modern man on his way, and therefore6 can be overcome only in its own terms. But nihilism can also be viewed as that7 which happened to8 man when the modern age erred from9 the “right path”, strayed away from10 the road of ancient and Christian tradition11. The latter12 is not only the position13 of modern14 catholic philosoph15 , but more generally of all those -- and they are very numerous16 in Europe today and write on a very high level -- who see in17 the secularization of the18 modern age the roots of the modern world’s perplexities19. Against “the worst philosophic chaos which the world has ever seen,”520) a “science of order” is summoned,22 up whose essence is the re-subordination24 of the temporal-political25 realm to the sphere of the spiritual,26 whereby the spiritual can be represented by the Catholic28 Church or the Christian faith in general29 as it can be represented by all sorts30 of revived Platonism.6) In any event, the subordination is justified31 in traditional terms -- as the inherent superiority32 of the end toward the33 means, the eternal over the34 temporal. The main impulse is always to bring order into xxxxx35 the things36 of the world37 which cannot38 be grasped39 and judged without |7 being submitted40 to the rule of some transcending principle. This impulse is especially strong among those who know41 the problems42 of modern nihilism best from their experiences with continental43, particularly Contral-European, historicism and do no longer believe with Meinecke that historicism will be able “to heal the wounds which it inflicted (on modern man) through44 the relativization45 of values”7). Yet46, it is precisely because the revival of tradition owes its impetus to historicism which taught man47 to read as he never read before8), that such a large amount of authentic modern philosophy is contained in interpretations of the great texts of the past. Quite apart from all commitments as to whether or not the breakdown of48 the authority49 of tradition is an irrevocable event50, these interpretations breathe a directness and vitality which is conspicuously absent from the many boring histories of philosophy produced [metamark 50] or [metamark 75] years ago. Those who argue for51 a return52 to tradition cannot and do not want to escape the modern climate53, and their interpretations therefore frequently bear55 the marks of Heidegger’s influence -- who was among the first56 to read the old texts with new eyes -- although they may reject Heidegger’s own philosophic tenets altogether57. In any event,58 this contemporary59 view of the whole extant body of past thought60 is no less startlingly new,61 no less “deforming” and doing “violence” to reality,62 if judged by the standards of alexandrinism,63 than modern art’s view on nature.	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	It is obvious that the same crisis1 can be considered2 from the opposite point of view. Nihilism in terms of historicity appears as3 the innermost fate4 of the modern age5, that which sent modern man on its way and therefore6 can be overcome only in its own terms. But nihilism can also be viewed as that7 which happened to8 man when the modern age erred from9 the “right path”, strayed away from10 the road of ancient and Christian tradition11. The latter12 is not only the position13 of modern14 catholic philosophy15, but more generally of all those --and they are very numerous16 in Europe today and write on a very high level--who see in17 the secularization of the18 modern age the roots of the modern world’s perplexities19. Against “the worst philosophic chaos which the world has ever seen,”520) a “science of order” is summoned up whose essence is the re-subordination24 of the temporal-political25 realm to the sphere of the spiritual,26 whereby the spiritual can be represented by the Catholic28 Church or the Christian faith in general29 as it can be represented by all sorts30 of revived Platonism.6) In any event, the subordination is justified31 in traditional terms--as the inherent superiority32 of the end over the33 means, the eternal over the34 temporal. The main impulse is always to bring order into35 the things36 of the world37 which cannot38 be grasped39 and judged without |7 being submitted40 to the rule of some transcending principle. This impulse is especially strong among those who know41 the problems42 of modern nihilism best from their experiences with continental43, particularly Central-European, historicism and do no longer believe with Meinecke that historicism will be able “to heal the wounds which it inflicted (on modern man) through44 the relativization45 of values”7). Yet46, it is precisely because the revival of tradition owes its impetus to historicism which taught man47 to read as he never read before8), that such a large amount of authentic modern philosophy is contained in interpretations of the great texts of the past.[metamark (text connection)] Quite apart from all commitments as to whether or not the breakdown of48 the authority49 of tradition is an irrevocable event50, these interpretations breathe a directness and vitality which is conspicuously absent from the many boring histories of philosophy produced ?50 or 75 years ago. Those who argue for51 a return52 to tradition cannot and do not want to escape the modern climate53, and their interpretations therefore frequently bear55 the marks of Heidegger’s influence --who was among the first56 to read the old texts with new eyes --although they may [metamark (text connection)]reject Heidegger’s own philosophic tenets altogether57. In any event,58 this contemporary59 view of the whole extant body of past thoughts60 is no less startlingly new,61 no less “deforming” and doing “violence” to reality,62 if judged by the standards of alexandrinism,63 than modern art’s view on nature.
11
The shortcomings1 of this approach lie2, as it were,3 in the opposite direction from that mentioned above. The answers given can hardly contain and do not intend to give more than restatements4 of “old truths”5, and these in turn are not only likely6 to appear singularly inadequate7 and questionable in their applicability, they are in a way question-begging. For8 the whole enterprise of re-stating them has been started by those who want to return to tradition as for everybody else by problems and questions whose very perplexity resided in not being foreseen by9 the tradition. To a large extent we10 are not at liberty to decide whether or not we want to return to tradition, because the breaking of the thread of tradition is a fact inherent11 in the modern world12. The return to tradition would13 imply much more than the mere ordering14 of a world which in its terms15 is “out of joint”,16 it would imply our reestablishing17 of a traditional world18. And even if we would grant that19 such an enterprise is not impossible20, which of course it is,21 the question of which of the many world,22 covered by one tradition,23 should be the one to be reestablished24 could never25 be answered except26 in terms of arbitrary choice.	It is1 of course no accident that Catholic philosophers have contributed more significant work to problems of political thought than almost any other modern trend. Men like Maritain and Gilson in France2, Guardini and Josef Pieper3 in Germany exert an influence far beyond the Catholic milieu because they can awaken an almost lost awareness for the relevance of the classical and permanent problems4 of political philosophy. This5, to an extent, they can do because of their blindness6 to the problem of history7 and their immunity to Hegelianism. Their short comings lie, as it were, in8 the opposite direction from that of the approach mentioned above. The positive answers given can hardly contain more than restatements of “old truths” and these -- i.e.9 the specifically positive side of their work --10 are liable to appear singularly inadequate and even |8 in a way question-begging. For the whole enterprise of re-stating them had become necessary through problems whose very perplexity lies11 in their not being foreseen by the tradition12. The return to tradition, therefore, seems to13 imply much more than the re-ordering14 of a world which is “out of joint”;16 it implies the re-establishment17 of a world which is past18. And even if such an enterprise were possible20, the question of which of the many worlds22 covered by one tradition should be re-established24 could be answered only26 in terms of arbitrary choice.	It is1 of course no accident that within this group Catholic philosophers have contributed more significant work to problems of political thought than almost any other [metamark |]group. Men like Maritain and Gilson in France2, Guardini and Josef Pieper3 in Germany exert an influence far beyond the Catholic milieu because they can awaken an almost lost awareness for the relevance of the classical and permanent problems4 of political philosophy. This5, to an extent, they can do because of their blindness6 to the problem of history7 and their immunity to Hegelianism. Their shortcomings lie, as it were, in8 the opposite direction from that of the approach mentioned above. The positive answers given can hardly contain more than restatements of “old truths” and these, i.e.9 the specifically positive side of their work,10 are liable to appear singularly inadequate and even in a way question-begging. For the whole enterprise of re-stating them had become necessary through problems whose very perplexity lies11 in their not being foreseen by the tradition12. The return to tradition, therefore, seems to13 imply much more than the re-ordering14 of a world which is “out of joint”;16 it implies the re-establishment17 of a world which is past18. And even if such an enterprise were possible20, the question of which of the many worlds22 covered by one tradition should be re-established24 could be answered only26 in terms of arbitrary choice.	It is1 of course no accident that within this group Catholic philosophers have contributed more significant work to problems of political thought than almost any other group . Men like Maritain and Gilson in France2, Guardini and Josef Pieper3 in Germany exert an influence far beyond the Catholic milieu because they could awaken an almost lost awareness for the relevance of the classical and permanent problems4 of political philosophy.[metamark (text connection)] This5, to an extent, they can do because of their blindness6 to the problem of history7 and their immunity to Hegelianism. Their shortcomings lie, as it were, in8 the opposite direction from that of the approach mentioned above. The positive answers given can hardly contain more than restatements of “old truths” and these, i.e.9 the specifically positive side of their work,10 are liable to appear singularly inadequate and even |8 in a way question-begging. For the whole enterprise of re-stating them had become necessary through problems whose very perplexity lies11 in their not being foreseen by the tradition12. The return to tradition, therefore, seems to13 imply much more than the re-ordering14 of a world which is “out of joint”;16 it implies the re-establishment17 of a world which is past18. And even if such an enterprise were possible20, the question of which of the many worlds22 covered by one tradition should be re-established24 could be answered only26 in terms of arbitrary choice. In order to avoid this difficulty, the advocates of tradition have shown a definite inclination to reduce the complexities of the present situation toward a common denominator: secularization and, by implication, to minimize their philosophical relevance. This attitude shows itself as clearly in Gilson who, insisting on the planetary character of contemporary events, holds that the establish ment of a universal society is inevitable, the only question being if it will come to pass as a communist tyranny or under strictly Christian authority, as it is evident in the recent words of the Arch Bishop of Canterbury, “There are only two kinds of people in the modern world who know what they are after. One is the Communist, the other is the convinced Christian. The rest of the world are ami able non-entities.” (Time Magazine, 9/6/54, p. 41) In another context, I tried to show that this kind of argument is in danger to transform the Christian religion into a modern ideology. In the alternative of Communism or Christianism, one has not so much demonstrated the religious character of Communism as one has “streamlined” the Christian faith into an ideology and deprived the modern Western world further of its genuine religious elements.27
12
In order to avoid this difficulty, the advocates of tradition are unavoidably led1 to minimize in a sense those experiences which have led to3 their own current4 concern with politics. To give a few examples, picked5 almost at random: Totalitarian ideologies will be depicted6 as “secular religions”7 which answer man’s assumedly9 eternal need for religion and which therefore can be cured by10 a simple return to the right religion12. This minimizes the shocking aspect of an important trend in modern society which denies the relevance14 of the question itself and professes an atheism of utter indifference. Or: the grave problem that we live in a laboring society15 of jobholders where everything is judged in terms of consumption and where the laboring activity itself, traditionally16 the lowest17 of all human activities, has become authoritative for everything else18, is explained in19 the old terms of the21 vita activa and the22 vita contemplativa23, or of work and leisure. This overlooks24 that the old ordering hierarchy resided on25 the fact of a political non-equality of laborers and that26 the modern problem arises from an equality which never had existed before and whose most important consequence is not only27 the equality of persons, but the implied equality (first) and prerogative (later) of laboring over all other activities. Finally: confronted with the event29 |7 planetary character of contemporary events, which according to Gilson distinguishes31 them from all others since the beginning of history, the traditional conclusion will be that we are approaching the moment of a “34universal society” which if it truly wants to unite35 all men must possess One36 principle which itself transcends man. From there follows easily that totalitarian Bolshevism which claims world rule is one of two alternatives, the other being37 Christianity in whose history the notion of a universal society based on38 the Christian dogma39 arose for the first time. Here,40 again, the problem itself is minimized and, as it were,41 rendered harmless: for42 it resides precisely in the plurality of nations and in the fact43 that politically speaking, the reality44 of freedom even of the spirit is bound up with such a plurality. For the freedom to disagree within any given community rests45, it46 is true, first on the possibility that others in that community may think as I do or that I may be able to persuade them47, but ultimately it rests on the fact that people in48 different lands think different49 and that, therefore, even if I happen to be in50 a minority of one, I am not necessarily outside all mankind51. The perplexity of the present situation52 is precisely that53 the danger of a universal society on one54 hand and55 the undeniable fact that under conditions of non-unity one56 nation in plain brutal fact feels57 the consequences and becomes responsible58 for every crime and blunder which may be committed59 at the other end of the world.	In order to avoid this difficulty, the advocates of tradition have shown a definite inclination1 to minimize those experiences which, among other things, aroused3 their own concern with politics. The following examples were selected because there exists a certain agreement on them: he reality of totalitarian domination is here depicted5 almost exclusively under its ideological aspect, and the ideologies are understood6 as “secular religions,”7 which either grow out of the “heresy” of secularization and immanentism or are supposed to8 answer man’s assumed9 eternal need for religion. In both cases,10 a simple return to right religion appears as11 the adequate cure12. This interpretation13 minimizes the shock of the actually committed crimes and dodges the question posed by that aspect14 of modern society which is most conspicuous in, but not confined to totalitarianism and which tends to deny the relevance of religion, professing an atheism15 of utter indifference. Or, it is true that Catholic thinkers are almost the only ones who consider16 the problem17 of labor in other than mere terms of social justice. Yet18, by applying to19 the problem the20 old terms of vita activa and vita contemplativa23, or of work and leisure, they overlook24 that this hierarchical order does not take into account25 the entirely unprecedented condition of universal equality, which is26 the source of our present difficulties because it does not merely involve the equality of the workers as persons, but27 the equality and even the prerogative28 of the laboring activity over all others. This is essentially what we mean when we say that we live in a society of jobholders. Finally, he29 planetary character of contemporary events, which,30 according to Gilson and others, |9 “distinguishes31 them from all others since the beginning of history ”32 , seems to make33 the establishment of a “universal society”8) almost a necessity. A34 universal society, in turn, is possible only if35 all adhere to one36 principle which can unite all nations because it equally transcends them all. The two alternatives seem to be totalitarianism with its claim to global rule and37 Christianity in whose history the notion of a universal society (in38 the varied forms of a civitas Dei)39 arose for the first time. Here again, the dangers of the factual situation are minimized and the problem41 rendered harmless, as42 it were. Our problem is43 that our concept44 of freedom, at least in its political aspects45, is inconceivable outside a reality of plurality, and this plurality includes not only different ways47, but different principles of life49 and thought. A universal society can only signify50 a threat to freedom51. Yet, there52 is, on53 the other54 hand,55 the undeniable fact that under conditions of non-unity every56 nation feels the consequences and must bear57 the responsibility (not morally, but in plain political factuality)58 for every crime and blunder which may be committed59 at the other end of the world.	In order to avoid this difficulty, the advocates of tradition have shown a definite inclination1 to reduce the complexities of the present situation toward a common denominator and, by implication, to2 minimize their philosophical relevance. This attitude shows itself as clearly in Gilson who, insisting on the planetary character of contemporary events, holds that the establish - ment of a universal society is inevitable, the only question being if it will come to pass as a communist tyranny or under strictly Christian authority, as it is evident in the recent words of the Bishop of Canterbury, “There are only two kinds of people in the modern world who know what they are after. One is the Communist, the other is the convinced Christian. The rest of the world are ami able non-entities.” (Time Magazine, 9/6/54, p. 41) In another context, I tried to show that this kind of argument is in danger to transform the Christian religion into a modern ideology. In the alternative of Communism or Christianism, one has not so much demonstrated the religious character of Communism as one has “streamlined” the Christian faith into an ideology and deprived the modern Western world further of its genuine religious elements. In order to avoid this difficulty, the advocates of tradition have shown a definite inclinitation to minimize those experiences which, among other things, aroused3 their own concern with politics. The following examples were selected because there exists certain vague agreement on them: the reality of totalitarian domination is here depicted5 almost exclusively under its ideological aspect, and the ideologies are understood6 as “secular religions”,7 which either |6 [metamark (text connection)]grow out of the “heresy” of secularization and immanentism or are supposed to8 answer man’s assumedly9 eternal need for religion. In both cases,10 a simple return to right religion [metamark |]is recommended as11 the adequate cure12. This interpretation13 minimizes the shock of the actually committed crimes and dodges the question posed by that aspect14 of modern society which is most conspicuous in, but not confined to totalitarianism, and which tends to deny the relevance of religion, professing an atheism15 of utter indifference. Or it is true that Catholic thinkers are almost the only ones who consider16 the problem17 of labor in other than mere terms of social justice. Yet18, by applying to19 the problem the20 old terms of vita activa and vita contemplitiva23, or of work and leisure, they overlook24 that this hierarchical order does not take into account25 the entirely unprecedented condition of universal equality, which is26 the source of our present difficulties because it does not merely involve the equality of the workers as persons, but27 the equality and even the prerogative28 of the laboring activity over all others. This is essentially what we mean when we say that we live in a society of jobholders. Finally the29 planetary character of contemporary events, which,30 according to Gilson and others, “disinguishes31 them from all others since the beginning of history, seems to make33 the establishment of a “universal society”8a) almost a necessity. A34 universal society, in turn, is possible only if35 all adhere to one36 principle which can unite all nations because it equally transcends them all. The two alternatives seem to be totalitarianism with its claim to global rule and37 Christianity in whose history the notion of a universal society (in38 the varied forms of a civitas Dei)39 arose for the first time. Here again, the dangers of the factual situation are minimized and the problem41 rendered harmless, as42 it were. Our problem is43 that our concept44 of freedom, at least in its political aspects45, is inconceivable outside a reality of plurality, and this plurality includes not only different ways47, but different principles of life49 and thought. A universal society can only signify50 a threat to freedom51. Yet, there52 is, on53 the other54 hand,55 the undeniable fact that under conditions of non-unity every56 nation feels the consequences and must bear57 the responsibility (not morally, but in plain political factuality)58 for every crime and blunder which may be commited59 at the other end of the world.	[metamark (text connection)]In order to avoid this difficulty, the advocates of tradition have shown a definite inclination1 to minimize those experiences which, among other things, aroused3 their own concern with politics. The following examples were selected because there exists a certain vague agreement on them: The reality of totalitarian domination is here depicted5 almost exclusively under its ideological aspect, and the ideologies are understood6 as “secular religions”,7 which either grow out of the “heresy” of secularization and immanentism or are supposed to8 answer man’s assumedly9 eternal need for religion. In both cases,10 a simple return to right religion is recommended as11 the adequate cure12. This interpretation13 minimizes the shock of the actually committed crimes and dodges the question posed by that aspect14 of modern society which is most conspicuous in, but not confined to totalitarianism and which tends to deny the relevance of religion, professing an atheism15 of utter indifference. Or it is true that Catholic thinkers are almost the only ones who consider16 the problem17 of labor in other than mere terms of social justice. Yet18, by applying to19 the problem the20 old terms of vita activa and vita contemplativa23, or of work and leisure, they overlook24 that this hierarchical order does not take into account25 the entirely unprecedented condition of universal equality, which is26 the source of our present difficulties because it does not merely involve the equality of the workers as persons, but27 the equality and even the prerogative28 of the laboring activity over all others. This is essentially what we mean when we say that we live in a society of jobholders. Finally: The29 planetary character of contemporary events, which,30 according to Gilson and others, |9 [metamark (text connection)]“distinguishes31 them from all others since the beginning of history, seems to make33 the establishment of a “universal society”8) almost a necessity. A34 universal society, in turn, is possible only if35 all adhere to one36 principle which can unite all nations because it equally transcends them all. The two alternatives seem to be totalitarianism with its claim to global rule and37 Christianity in whose history the notion of a universal society (in38 the varied forms of a civitas Dei)39 arose for the first time. Here again, the dangers of the factual situation are minimized and the problem41 rendered harmless, as42 it were. Our problem is43 that our concept44 of freedom, at least in its political aspects45, is inconceivable outside a reality of plurality, and this plurality includes not only different ways47, but different principles of life49 and thought. A universal society can only signify50 a threat to freedom51. Yet, there52 is on53 the other54 hand,55 the undeniable fact that under conditions of non-unity every56 nation feels the consequences and must bear57 the responsibility (not morally, but in plain political factuality)58 for every crime and blunder which may be committed59 at the other end of the world.
13
These remarks may sound more critical than they intend1 to be. As matters in the political and social sciences stand today, we are deeply indebted to this2 traditional trend in political philosophy, insofar as its3 awareness of the crucial questions and its freedom from commitment to any5 modern trend helps to clear6 the atmosphere7 of the numerous superstitious non-sense which under the cloack of scientific statements undermines all discussions and clouds all issues. We8 would have to acknowledge our gratitude9 if they had not done more than to revive10 and reformulate11 the old question: What is Politics? in the midst of modern controversies where it seems so difficult to remember what one is talking12 about.13 But they have done much more. They have thrown the old answers into the modern14 confusion, and while these may not be adequate to the perplexities which caused the confusion, they certainly |8 are the greatest single factor16 in clearing our minds17 and forcing18 upon them19 a sense for relevance and depth in a chaotic situation20.	These remarks may sound more critical than they are intended1 to be. As matters in the political and social sciences stand today, we are deeply indebted to the2 traditional trend in political philosophy because of its constant3 awareness of the crucial questions and its remarkable4 freedom from all kinds of5 modern nonsense. In6 the midst7 of our controversies, where it seems so difficult to remember what one is talking about, it8 would have been enough9 if they had merely revived10 and reformulated11 the old question: What is politics all12 about?13 But they have done much more. They have thrown the old answers into the new14 confusion, and while these may not be wholly15 adequate to the perplexities which caused the confusion, they certainly are the greatest single factor16 in helping us clear our minds17 and to force18 upon them19 a sense for relevance and depth.	These remarks may sound more critical than they are intended1 to be. As matters in the political and social sciences stand today, we are deeply indebted to the2 traditional trend in political philosophy because of its constant3 awareness of the crucial questions and its remarkable4 freedom from all kinds of5 modern nonsense. In6 the midst7 of our controversies, where it seems so difficult to remember what one is talking about, it8 would have been enough9 if they had merely revived10 and reformulated11 the old question: What is politics all12 about?13 But they have done much more. They have thrown the old answers into the new14 confusion, and while these may not be adequate to the perplexities which caused the confusion, they certainly are the greatest single help16 in clarification17 and constantlyforce18 upon [metamark |]us19 a sense for relevance and depth.	These remarks may sound more critical than they are intended1 to be. As matters in the political and social sciences stand today, we are deeply indebted to the2 traditional trend in political philosophy because of its constant3 awareness of the crucial questions and its remarkable4 freedom from all kinds of5 modern nonsense. In6 the midst7 of our controversies where it sometimes seems difficult to remember what one is talking about, it8 would have been enough9 if they had merely revived10 and reformulated11 the old question: What is politics all12 about?13 But they have done much more. They have thrown the old answers into the new14 confusion, and while these may not be wholly15 adequate to the perplexities which caused the confusion, they certainly are the greatest single help16 in clarification17 and constantly force18 upon us19 a sense for relevance and depth.
14
In more than one sense, it seems as though modern Catholicism1 and what is commonly called existientialism correspond to each other in that they usually take2 the two opposite views or ask the two opposite questions. Seen from this viewpoint which is of course outside either of them3, the quarrel between them is quite illuminating for4 the questions at stake. In the following I shall deal only with French existentialism5, chiefly with Sartre6 and Merleau Ponty7, Camus and Malraux, whose kinship with German modern philosophy8 has been somewhat overemphasized9. True is that French existentialism appeals11 to certain modern experiences which had become12 urgent in Germany already13 after the first14 world war, so that when France, during and after15 the second world war, became ready for them and willing to discard for their sake academic philosophy they found a good deal of them already formulated by the older generation16 in Germany. They also17, though to a lesser extent, share with German modern philosophy18 the influence19 of Pascal, Kierkegaard20 and 🞽 Dostoevsky Sade Nietzsche; this21, however22, is by far overshadowed by the24 influence of Hegel25 and Marx on modern French thought, an influence which is much less significant for that trend in German contemporary thought which is commonly indicated by the names of Jaspers and Heidegger26. By and large27, and talking in terms of national tradition, they all stand still28 in the line of the French moralist thinkers and29 the influence30 of Cartesian philosophy, almost negligible in Germany, remains with them whether they acknowledge it or not31.	The French existentialists -- Malraux1 and Camus on one side, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on2 the other -- with their open rejection of all past philosophy that antedates the French Revolution and their emphatic atheism3, constitute the opposite pole of4 the modern revival of Thomism. Their dependence upon the work of German contemporary philosophers5, notably Jaspers6 and Heidegger7, has been somewhat exaggerated9 |10 . True it10 is that they appeal11 to certain modern experiences which became12 urgent in France only during and13 after the second14 world war, and these had already been formulated in Germany by15 the older generation during the twenties. The breach with academic philosophy, prepared even before the first war by Simmel in Germany and by Bergson in France, happened twenty years laterin France than16 in Germany. Today17, however, this breach is much more radical in Paris where18 the greater part19 of significant philosophic work is done20 and published outside the universities. Moreover21, the influence of Pascal22, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche23 is less marked in France where the24 [metamark :] influence of Dostoevsky25 and the Marquis de Sade is stronger . All these, however, are overshadowed by the influence of Hegel and Marx on French , as distinguished from German, modern thought26. But what is striking27, even at first glance, is that style and form of expression remain28 in the line of the French moralists and that29 the extreme subjectivism30 of Cartesian philosophy has found here its last and most radical representation31.	The French existentialists--Malraux1 and Camus on one side, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on2 the other--with their open rejection of all past philosophy that antedates the French Revolution and their emphatic atheism3, constitute the opposite pole of4 the modern revival of Thomism. Their dependence upon the work of German contemporary philosophers5, notably Jaspers6 and Heidegger7, has been somewhat exaggerated9. True it10 is that they appeal11 to certain modern experiences which became12 urgent in France only during and13 after the second14 world war, and these had already been formulated in Germany by15 the older generation during the twenties. The breach with academic philosophy, prepared even before the first war by Simmel in Germany and by Bergson in France, happened in France twenty years later than16 in Germany. Today17, however, this breach is much more radical in Paris where18 the greater part19 of significant philosophic work is done20 and published outside the universities. Moreover21, the influence of Pascal22, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche23 is less marked in France and supplemented by a strong24 influence of Dostoevsky25 and the Marquis de Sade. All these, however, are overshadowed by the influence of Hegel and Marx on French as distinguished from German modern thought26. But what is striking27, even at first glance, is that style and form of expression remain28 in the line of the French moralists and that29 the extreme subjectivism30 of Cartesian philosophy has found here its last and most radical expression31.	[metamark #] The French existentialists--Malraux1 and Camus on one side, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on2 the other--with their open rejection of all past philosophy that antedates the French Revolution and their emphatic atheism3, constitute the opposite pole of4 the modern revival of Thomism. Their dependence upon the work of German contemporary philosophers5, notably Jaspers6 and Heidegger7, has been somewhat exaggerated9 |10 . True it10 is that they appeal11 to certain modern experiences which became12 urgent in France only during and13 after the second14 world war, while they had already been formulated in Germany by15 the older generation during the twenties. [metamark (text connection)]The breach with academic philosophy, prepared even before the first war by Simmel in Germany and by Bergson in France, happened in France twenty years later than16 in Germany. Today17, however, this breach is much more radical in Paris where18 the greater part19 of significant philosophic work is done20 and published outside the universities. Moreover21, the influence of Pascal22, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche23 is less marked in France and supplemented by a strong24 influence of Dostoevsky25 and the Marquis de Sade. All these, however, are overshadowed by the influence of Hegel and Marx on French as distinguished from German modern thought26. But what is striking27, even at first glance, is that style and form of expression remain28 in the line of the French moralists and that29 the extreme subjectivism30 of Cartesian philosophy has found here its last and most radical expression31 .
15
The outstanding characteristic of1 French existentialism is that it is political2 in an altogether different sense from3 the concern with politics which we may find4 in the other philosophers mentioned here5. For this being political6 is neither the attempt to find7 appropriate philosophical8 answers to the9 political perplexities as in Catholic and Christian philosophical thought,10 nor the attempt to formulate philosophically and inquire into the philosophical relevan ce of certain contemporary experiences, with politics, as we find it11 in modern German philosophical thought12 and its attempt to analyze trends in the modern world. French existentialism looks, on the contrary,13 to politics in order to find14 the answers for certain philosophical perplexities15 which it finds16 resist all solution or even adequate |9 formulation in purely philosophical17 terms. This is the reason why Sartre never made good18 his promise to follow up Etre19 et Néant with a treatise on moral-political20 philosophy but21, instead, started to write22 plays and novels and to found23 a quasi-political magazine. But it24 is not only Sartre, no matter what their individual philosophy, it is25 as though this whole generation escaped into politics26 from philosophy,27 and in this they were preceded by Malraux,29 who already in the twenties (in a curious resemblance with T31:S: Lawrence) stated:32 “One always finds the horror in oneself. ...33 Fortunately, one can act”, so that they all could say with him that the “revolution plays the role which once was played by eternal life”, it “saves those who make it34.” It is primarily in this sense35, that they all became revolutionaries in the more narrow sense of the word. That Sartre and Merleau Ponty adopted a modified Marxism as the logique of the revolution while Malraux and Camus insist that rebellion itself, without any historical system or definition of ends and means, is important enough, but only in the sense that the latter keep the original impulse of this generation pure and intact, while Sartre and Merleau Ponty have permitted themselves to be tempted back into Hegelian metaphysics. For this original impulse is the sentiment not that the world as of today is out of joint, but that existence itself is absurd because it presents its insoluble questions to a reasonable being who with all its reason will never be able to find the answers. The “nausea of senseless existence” as Sartre puts it, the absurdity of human existence in Camus, the fear that in Western civilization “man died after it discovered with Nietzsche that God is dead” as Malraux formulated--in short, the nihilistic situation of modern man can be resolved only by an unreasoned jump into36 action, by an awareness🞽 Insert: Jump into belief-- of man being condemned to be free (Sartre). As acting and interested being, as distinguished from a thinking and observing one, man can escape37 the nausea which rises in him whenever he contemplates the givenness and denseness38 of an inexplicable universe. Here39, one can say philosophy does its utmost in order to abolish itself; and pure thought appears to be necessary40 only as a kind of spring board into the ocean of chaotic possibilities where everybody because of his engagement (comitment) can become whatever he chooses to be and is no longer delivered to the giveness of mere existence. |10 Naturally, the political salvation from the nihilistic situation or the salvation from thought through action can hardly be asked to develop a political philosophy. What is worse, it cannot even give direction for political choice or formulate political principles even41 in the most formal sense42. This philosophy (whose extreme subjectivism can still be clearly traced back to Cartesian philosophy insofar as the only certitude43, and therefore44 the springboard into action, remains45 the sentiment of individual existence in the midst of a chaotic, incoherent and incomprehensible universe) may indicate that only action, i.e. conscious change of a meaningless world, may solve the meaningless, absurd relationship between man and world, as it only the defiance of death in courage can save man from death (Malraux), but it can not give any directives or offer any orientation in terms of its own problems. It is therefore not surprising that so many of these philosophers have adopted Marxism as their frame of reference for action, although hardly any of them owes to Marx’s own philosophy the authentic impulses of his thought. It is as though,46 once they have argued themselves out of the philosophical impasse of nihilism47, almost everything in the field of action will do, as long as48 it promises revolutionary change. and gives the individual,49 who joins in one of the movements, the chance to become whatever he may wish to be.50	In our context, the1 French existentialists are distinguished from all other trends2 in modern philosophy insofar as they are3 the only ones whose concern with politics stands4 in the very center of their work5. For them, it6 is not a question of finding the7 appropriate philosophic8 answers to political perplexities;10 nor are they very interested or particularly skilfull11 in analyzing modern trends12 and discovering their philosophic relevance. on the contraryThey look,,stet13 to politics for14 the solution of philosophic perplexities,15 which in their opinion16 resist all solution or even adequate formulation in purely philosophic17 terms. This is the reason why Sartre never fulfilled (or mentioned again)18 his promise at the end of L’Etre19 et le Néant to write a moral20 philosophy,9) but instead wrote22 plays and novels and founded23 a quasi-political magazine. It24 is as though this whole generation tried to escape26 from philosophy into politics;27 and in this,28 they were preceded by Malraux who already stated30 in the twenties: “One always finds the horror in oneself. .. Fortunately, one can act.” Under present circumstances35, true36 action, namely37 the beginning38 of something new39, seems possible40 only in revolutions42. Therefore43, “44the revolution plays,45 the role which46 once was played by eternal |11 life47,”48 it “saves those49 who make it.”10)50	In our context, the1 French existentialists are distinguished from all other trends2 in modern philosophy insofar as they are3 the only ones whose concern with politics stands4 in the very center of their work5. For them, it6 is not a question of finding the7 appropriate philosophic8 answers to political perplexities;10 nor are they very interested or particularly skillful11 in analyzing [metamark |]historical trends12 and discovering their philosophic relevance. They look, on the contrary,13 to politics for14 the solution of philosophic perplexities15 which in their opinion16 resist all solution or even adequate formulation in purely philosophic[metamark |]al17 terms. This is the reason why Sartre never fulfilled (or mentioned again)18 his promise at the end of L’Etre19 et le Néant to write a moral20 philosophy,9) but instead wrote22 plays and novels and founded23 a quasi-political magazine. It24 is as though this whole generation tried to escape26 from philosophy into politics;27 and in this,28 they were preceded by Malraux who already stated30 in the twenties: “One always finds the horror in oneself. . . .33 Fortunately, one can act.” Under present circumstances35, true36 action, namely37 the beginning38 of something new39, seems possible40 only in revolutions42. Therefore43, “44the revolution plays . . .45 the role which46 once was played by eternal life47,”48 it “saves those49 who make it.”10)50	The1 French existentialists are distinguished from all other trends2 in modern philosophy insofar as they are3 the only ones whose concern with politics stands4 in the very center of their work5. For them, it6 is not a question of finding the7 appropriate philosophic8 answers to political perplexities;10 nor are they very interested or particularly skilfull11 in analyzing historical trends12 and discovering their philosophic relevance. They look, on the contrary,13 to politics for14 the solution of philosophic perplexities15 which in their opinion16 resist all solution or even adequate formulation in purely philosophical17 terms. This is the reason why Sartre never fulfilled (or mentioned again)18 his promise at the end of L’Etre19 et le Néant to write a moral20 philosophy,9) but instead wrote22 plays and novels and founded23 a quasi-political magazine. It24 is as though this whole generation tried to escape26 from philosophy into politics;27 and in this,28 they were preceded by Malraux who already stated30 in the twenties: “One always finds the horror in oneself. .. Fortunately, one can act.” Under present circumstances35, true36 action, namely37 the beginning38 of something new39, seems possible40 only in revolutions42. Therefore43, “44the revolution plays ...45 the role which46 once was played by eternal |11 life47,”48 it “saves those49 who make it.”10)50
16
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	In this sense and primarilyfor1 these philosophical, and not social reasons, the existentialists became all revolutionists and entered active political life. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty adopted a modified Hegelian Marxism as a kind of logique of the revolution, while Malraux and especially Camus continue to insist on rebellion, without a historical system and an elaborate definition of ends and means, on l’homme revolté, on man in rebellion, in Camus’ telling phrase11).5 This difference is important enough, but the original impulse which the former compromised for Hegelian metaphysics and the latter kept in great purity, is the same: the point is not that the present world has come into a crisis and is “out of joint”, but that human existence as such is “absurd” because it presents insoluble questions to a being endowed with reason. (Camus.12) Sartre’s nausea of senseless existence,i.e. man’s reaction before the sheer density and givenness of the world, coincides with his hatred of the salauds, the bourgeois philistines, who in their complacency believe that they live in the best of all possible worlds. The image of the bourgeois is not the exploiter, but this complacent salaud who assumes an almost metaphysical significance.13) The way out of this situation opens when man becomes aware of his “being condemned to be free” (Sartre) and “jumps” into action -- just as Kierkegaard jumped into belief out of universal doubt. (The Cartesian origin of the existentialist leap is as manifest in the leap into action: the springboard this time is the certitude of individual existence in the midst of an uncertain, incoherent and incomprehensible universe, which only belief -- Kierkegaard -- can illuminate or only action can endow with humanly comprehensible meaning.) The disgust with an absurd existence disappears when man discovers6 that he himself is not given to himself but through commitment (engagement) can become whoever he chooses to be. Human freedom means that man creates himself in an ocean of chaotic possibilities.	In this sense and for1 these primiarly2 philosophical, and not for3 social reasons, the existentialists became all revolutionists and entered active political life. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty adopted a modified Hegelian Marxism as a kind of logique of the revolution, while Malraux and especially Camus continue to insist on rebellion, without a historical system and an elaborate definition of ends and means, on l’homme revolté, on man in rebellion, in |8 Camus’ telling phrase.411) This difference is important enough, but the original impulse which the former compromised for Hegelian metaphysics and the latter kept in great purity, is the same: the point is not that the present world has come into a crisis and is “out of joint”, but that human existence as such is “absurd” because it presents insoluble questions to a being endowed with reason. (Camus.12) Sartre’s nausea of senseless existence, i.e. man’s reaction before the sheer density and givenness of the world, coincides with his hatred of the salauds, the bourgeois philistines, who in their complacency believe that they live in the best of all possible worlds. The image of the bourgeois is not the exploiter, but this complacent salaud who assumes an almost metaphysical significance.13) The way out of this situation opens when man becomes aware of his “being condemned to be free” (Sartre) and “jumps” into action--just as Kierkegaard jumped into belief out of universal doubt. (The Cartesian origin of the existentialist leap is as manifest in the leap into action: the springboard this time is the certitude of individual existence in the midst of an uncertain, incoherent and incomprehensible universe, which only belief--Kierkegaard--can illuminate or only action can endow with humanly comprehensible meaning.) The disgust with an absurd existence disappears when man discovers6 that he himself is not given to himself but through commitment (engagement) can become whoever he chooses to be. Human freedom means that man creates himself in an ocean of chaotic possibilities.	In this sense and for1 these primarily2 philosophical, and not for3 social reasons, the existentialists became all revolutionists and entered active political life. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty adopted a modified Hegelian Marxism as a kind of logique of the revolution, while Malraux and especially Camus continue to insist on rebellion, without a historical system and an elaborate definition of ends and means, on l’homme revolté, on man in rebellion, in Camus’ telling phrase11).5 This difference is important enough, but the original impulse which the former compromised for Hegelian metaphysics and the latter kept in great purity, is the same: the point is not that the present world has come into a crisis and is “out of joint”, but that human existence as such is “absurd” because it presents insoluble questions to a being endowed with reason. (Camus.12) Sartre’s nausea of senseless existence, i.e. man’s reaction before the sheer density and givenness of the world, coincides with his hatred of the salauds, the bourgeois philistines, who in their complacency believe that they live in the best of all possible worlds. The image of the bourgeois is not the exploiter, but this complacent salaud who assumes an almost metaphysical significance.13) The way out of this situation opens when man becomes aware of his “being condemned to be free” (Sartre) and “jumps” into action--just as Kierkegaard jumped into belief out of universal doubt. [metamark (text connection)](The Cartesian origin of the existentialist leap is as manifest in the leap into action: the springboard this time is the certitude of individual existence in the midst of an uncertain, incoherent and incomprehensible universe, which only belief--Kierkegaard--can illuminate or only action can endow with humanly comprehensible meaning.) The disgust with an absurd existence disappears when man discoveres6 that he himself is not given to himself but through commitment (engagement) can become whoever he chooses to be. Human freedom means that man creates himself in an ocean of chaotic possibilities.
17
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	It would be a contradiction in terms if this political salvation out of the nihilistic situation, or the salvation from thought through action would develop a political philosophy. It cannot even be expected to formulate political principles in the most formal sense, let alone give direction to political choice. As philosophers, the French existentialists can lead to the point where only revolutionary action, |12 the conscious change of a meaningless1 world, can solve2 meaninglessness inherent in the absurd relationship between man and world, but it cannot indicate any orientation in terms of its own original problems. Viewed from the side of pure thought, all its solutions bear the hallmark of a heroic futility which is most noticeable in Camus and Malraux, who hail the old virtues in the spirit of a desperate defiance of3 their senselessness. Thus, Malraux insists,4 that man saves himself from death through the defiance of death in courage. It is because of this illusionary character of all solutions which originate in their own philosophy, that Sartre and Merleau-Ponty simply adopted, superimposed, as it were, Marxism as their frame of reference for action, although their original impulses owed hardly anything to Marxism. It is not surprising that once they6 have argued themselves out of the impasse of nihilism with essentially identical arguments, they7 part company and adopt altogether different positions on the political scene: within the field of action, everything becomes entirely arbitrary as long as it promises revolutionary change.	It would be a contradiction in terms if this political salvation out of the nihilistic situation, or the salvation from thought through action would develop a political philosophy. It cannot even be expected to formulate political principles in the most formal sense, let alone give direction to political choice. As philosophers, the French existentialists can lead to the point where only revolutionary action, the conscious change of a meaninless1 world, can [metamark |]dissolve [metamark |]the2 meaninglessness inherent in the absurd relationship between man and world, but it cannot indicate any orientation in terms of its own original problems. Viewed from the side of pure thought, all its solutions bear the hallmark of a heroic futility which is most noticeable in Camus and Malraux, who hail the old virtues in the spirit of a desperate defiance of3 their senselessness. [metamark (text connection)]Thus, Malraux insists that man saves himself from death through the defiance of death in courage. It is because of this illusionary character of all solutions which originate in their own philosophy, that Sartre and Merleau-Ponty simply adopted, superimposed, as it were, Marxism as their frame of reference for action, although their original impulses owed hardly anything to Marxism. It is not surprising that [metamark |]the members of this school,5 once they6 have argued themselves out of the impasse of nihilism with essentially identical arguments, part company and adopt altogether different positions on the political scene: within the field of action, everything becomes entirely arbitrary as long as it promises revolutionary change. All this, one may object, holds little hope for political philosophy and more often than not looks like a very complicated play of rather desperate children. The fact, however, is that each of these men has a definite influence on the French political scene and that they more than any other group feel obliged to take their stand on everyday questions, to become editors of dailies |9 [metamark (text connection)]and address political meetings. Whatever one may hold against them, they have taken seriously the rejection of academic philosophy and the abandonment of the position of contemplation. What separates them from Marxism and deGaullism or any other movements they join is first that, in the words of an excellently informed British writer,13a they never “seek to validate their reasoning by reference to fixed principles” , and second that their revolution is never primarily directed against social or political conditions, but against the human condition as such. Courage, according to Malraux, challenges the human condition of mortality; freedom, according to Sartre, challenges the human condition of “being thrown into the world” (a notion he took over from Heidegger); and reason, according to Camus, challenges the human condition of having to live in the midst of absurdity.8	It would be a contradiction in terms if this political salvation out of the nihilistic situation, or the salvation from thought through action would develop a political philosophy. It cannot even be expected to formulate political principles in the most formal sense, let alone give direction to political choice. As philosophers, the French existentialists can lead to the point where only revolutionary action, |12 the conscious change of a meaningless1 world, can resolve the2 meaninglessness inherent in the absurd relationship between man and world, but it cannot indicate any orientation in terms of its own original problems. Viewed from the side of pure thought, all its solutions bear the hallmark of a heroic futility which is most noticeable in Camus and Malraux, who hail the old virtues in the spirit of a desperate defiance to3 their senselessness. [metamark (text connection)]Thus, Malraux insists,4 that man saves himself from death through the defiance of death in courage. It is because of this illusionary character of all solutions which originate in their own philosophy, that Sartre and Merleau-Ponty simply adopted, superimposed, as it were, Marxism as their frame of reference for action, although their original impulses owed hardly anything to Marxism. It is not surprising that the members of this school,5 once have argued themselves out of the impasse of nihilism with essentially identical arguments, part company and adopt altogether different positions on the political scene: within the field of action, everything becomes entirely arbitrary as long as it promises revolutionary change.
18
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	All this, one may object, holds little hope for political philosophy and more often than not looks like a very complicated play of rather desperate children. The fact, however, is that each of these men has a definite influence on the French political scene and that they more than any other group feel obliged to take stand on everyday questions, to become editors of dailies and address political meetings. Whatever one may hold against them, they have taken seriously the rejection of academic philosophy and the abandonment of the position of contemplation. What separates them from Marxism or de Gaullism or any other movements they join is that their revolution is never primarily directed against social or political conditions, but against the human condition as such. Courage, according to Malraux, challenges the human condition of mortality; freedom, according to Sartre , challenges the human condition of “being thrown into the world” (a notion he took from Heidegger); and reason, according to Camus, challenges the human condition of having to live in the midst of absurdity.	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	All this, one may object, holds little hope for political philosophy and more often than not looks like a very complicated play of rather desperate children. The fact, however, is that each of these men has a definite influence on the French political scene and that they more than any other group feel obliged to take their1 stand on everyday questions, to become editors of dailies and address political meetings. Whatever one may hold against them, they have taken seriously the rejection of academic philosophy and the abandonment of the position of contemplation. What separates them from Marxism or deGaullism or any other movements they join is first2 that, in the words of an excellently informed British writer, (13a) they never “seek to validate3 their reasoning by reference to fixed principles,” and second that their4 revolution is never primarily directed against social or political conditions, but against the human condition as such. Courage, according to Malraux, challenges the human condition of mortality; freedom, according to Sartre , challenges the human condition of “being thrown into the world” (a notion he took from Heidegger); and reason, according to Camus, challenges the human condition of having to live in the midst of absurdity.
19
All this, one may object has little to do with1 political philosophy and looks like idle play. The fact, however, is that each of these men has a definite influence in French politics and that they more than their colleagues in almost any country feel obliged to take a stand on everyday questions or even to become editors of dailies and adress political meetings. Whatever one2 may hold against them, they have taken seriously the abandonment of academic philosophy and the departure from philosophy’s contemplative position. Their central notion is perhaps3 best expressed in the title of Camus’ last book: l’homme révolté. What separates them from Marxism even when they try to adopt it for practical reasons is that their revolution is primarily not directed against conditions in society, but against the human condition as such. Death as an inherent part of the human condition can4 be overcome by Courage according to Malraux, just5 as the limitation6 of human reason which makes life absurd can be challenged through freedom according to Camus,7 or as, for almost all |11 of them,8 the predicaments of atheism (in Nietzsche’s sense9 that God10 is dead) can be healed through an activistic humanism which will proclaim that man is11 the highest being for man, and act accordingly12. In this activistic humanism, the political realm is seen14 as the15 sphere in which16 through the concerted activities17 of many a world may19 be built which will give the lie or constantly defy20 the human condition and, instead, make it possible for21 human nature which in the French moralistic and Cartesian tradition is primarily defined in22 the old sense of23 animal rationale to develop to the point where it builds a reality of its own. Man26, then, will move in an entirely human and27 man-made reality28 so that “29the absurdity of human life”--to be thrown as a reasonable being into the midst of incoherence, to live in the form of daily approaching death more closely, etc.--30will cease to exist,31 not of course for the individual, but for mankind and the human artifice. At least while he is alive, man will be able to move in an entirely human world34, coherent and ordered and understandable in the light of his own reason. He will defy God or the gods by living as though the limitations of his condition did not exist, even though he individually cannot hope ever35 to escape them. Man can become the highest being for man when36 he decides to live as though he were a God37. From the paradoxy which has plagued philosophy in the form of the problem of theodicy for so many centuries38 that man, even39 though he did not make himself, is held responsible for what he is, one can according to40 Sartre also conclude41 that therefore he42 must be held to be his own Maker.	Their common1 political denominator2 may best be described5 as a kind6 of activistic7 or radical humanism which does not compromise on8 the old claim9 that Man10 is the highest 🞽 ? being for man, that Man is his own God12. ?13 In this |13 activistic humanism, politics appears14 as that15 sphere where,16 through the concerted efforts17 of many,18 a world my19 be built which constantly defies and gives the lie to20 the human condition; this, in turn, will permit21 human nature, conceived as that of22 the animal rationale,24 to develop to the point where it builds a reality, creates conditions25 of its own. Men26, then, will move in an entirely humanized,27 man-made reality,28 so that the absurdity of human life will cease to exist --31 not of course for the individual, but for mankind and in32 the midst of the33 human artifice. At least while he is alive, man will live in a world of their own34, coherent and ordered and understandable in the light of his own reason. He will defy God or the gods by living as though the limitations of his condition did not exist, even though he as an individual may never hope35 to escape them. Man can create himself and become his own God if36 he decides to live as though he were a god37. From the paradox38 that man, though he did not make himself, is held responsible for what he is, Sartre concludes41 that he therefore42 must be held to be his own Maker.14)43	Their common1 political denominator2 may best be described5 as a kind6 of activistic7 or radical humanism which does not compromise on8 the old claim9 that Man10 is the highest being for man, that Man is his own God12. In this activistic humanism, politics appears14 as that15 sphere where,16 through the concerted efforts17 of many,18 a world may19 be built which constantly defies and gives the lie to20 the human condition; this, in turn, will permit21 human nature, conceived as that of22 the animal rationale,24 to develop to the point where it builds a reality, creates conditions25 of its own. Men26, then, will move in an entirely humanized,27 man-made reality,28 so that the absurdity of human life will cease to exist--31not of course for the individual, but for mankind and in32 the midst of the33 human artifice. At least while he is alive, man will live in a world of his own34, coherent and ordered and understandable in the light of his own reason. He will defy God or the gods by living as though the limitations of his condition did not exist, even though he as an individual may never hope35 to escape them. Man can create himself and become his own God if36 he decides to live as though he were a god37. From the paradox38 that man, though he did not make himself, is held responsible for what he is, Sartre concludes41 that he therefore42 must be held to be his own Maker.14)43 [metamark (text connection)]	Their common1 political denominator2 may best be described5 as a kind6 of activistic7 or radical humanism which does not compromise on8 the old claim9 that Man10 is the highest being for man, but concludes Man is his own God12. In this |13 activistic humanism, politics appears14 as that15 sphere where,16 through the concerted efforts17 of many,18 a world may19 be built which constantly defies and gives the lie to20 the human condition; this, in turn, will permit21 human nature, conceived as that of22 the animal rationale,24 to develop to the point where it builds a reality, creates conditions25 of its own. Men26, then, will move in an entirely humanized,27 man-made world ,28 so that the absurdity of human life will cease to exist--31not of course for the individual, but for mankind and in32 the midst of the33 human artifice. At least while he is alive, man will live in a world of his own34, coherent and ordered and understandable in the light of his own reason. He will defy God or the gods by living as though the limitations of his condition did not exist, even though he as an individual may never hope35 to escape them. Man can create himself and become his own God if36 he decides to live as though he were a god37. From the paradox38 that man, though he did not make himself, is held responsible for what he is, Sartre concludes41 that he therefore42 must be held to be his own Maker.14)43
20
The utopian elements in this philosophical1 approach to politics, or rather this attempt to save one’s soul through political action, are too obvious to be pointed out. Interesting is that this3 attempt to do away with the4 human condition for5 the sake6 of human nature8 comes at a time, and9 in a way as the answer to those modern10 attempts of changing11 human nature by conditioning man with which we are all too familiar12 in totalitarian regimes, and, unfortunately, not only there.13 I am afraid that it would be over-optimistic14 to maintain15 that both16 attempts are equally utopian and therefore17 doomed to failure. Human nature because of its inherent unpredictability which19 in philosophical terms20 means that it cannot be defined like other things is much21 more likely to yield to conditioning and transformations (though perhaps only for a limited time),24 than the human condition which is the condition25 under which life is given to men under26 all circumstances. However that may be, |12 it27 seems manifest that28 the French existentialists’ concern with politics or the high esteem in29 which modern French philosophy holds action and comitment springs much rather from a desire30 to escape philosophy altogether than from an attempt to reformulate a political philosophy on the ground of certain political experiences to which philos31. of the past has paid either too little or the wrong kind of attention.32	The utopian elements in this approach to politics, or rather this attempt to save one’s soul through political action, are too obvious to be pointed out. Interesting it2 is that the3 attempt to save4 human nature at5 the expense6 of the7 human condition8 comes at a time when we are all too familiar --9 in totalitarian regimes and unfortunately not only there -- with10 attempts to change11 human nature by radically changing the traditional conditions. All the manifold experiments12 in modern science and politics to “condition” man have no other aim than the transformation of human nature for the sake of society13 I am afraid that it would be overoptimistic14 to claim15 that these two opposite16 attempts are equally doomed to failure. Human nature,18 because of its inherent unpredictability (the darkness of the human heart19 in Biblical language) -- which philosophically20 means that it cannot be defined like other things -- may be21 more likely to yield to “22conditioning”23 and transformations (though perhaps only for a limited time) than the human condition which under all circumstances seems to remain28 the condition under29 which life is given30 to man at all31.	The utopian elements in this approach to politics, or rather this attempt to save one’s soul through political action, are too obvious to be pointed out. Interesting is that the3 attempt to save4 human nature at5 the expense6 of the7 human condition8 comes at a time when we are all too familiar--9in totalitarian regimes and unfortunately not only there--with10 attempts to change11 human nature by radically changing the traditional conditions. All the manifold experiments12 in modern science and politics to “condition” man have no other aim than the transformation of human nature for the sake of society.13 I am afraid that it would be overoptimistic14 to claim15 that these two opposite16 attempts are equally doomed to failure. Human nature,18 because of its inherent unpredictability (the darkness of the human heart19 in Biblical language)--which philosophically20 means that it cannot be defined like other things--may be21 more likely to yield to “22conditioning”23 and transformations (though perhaps only for a limited time) than the human condition which under all circumstances seems to remain28 the condition under29 which life on earth is given30 to man at all31.	[metamark (text connection)]The utopian elements in this approach to politics, or rather this attempt to save one’s soul through political action, are too obvious to be pointed out. Interesting is that the3 attempt to save4 human nature at5 the expense6 of the7 human condition8 comes at a time when we are all too familiar--9in totalitarian regimes and unfortunately not only there--with10 attempts to change11 human nature by radically changing the traditional conditions. All the manifold experiments12 in modern science and politics to “condition” man have no other aim than the transformation of human nature for the sake of Society.13 I am afraid that it would be overoptimistic14 to claim15 that these two opposite16 attempts are equally doomed to failure. Human nature,18 because of its inherent unpredictability (the darkness of the human heart19 in Biblical language)--which philosophically20 means that it cannot be defined like other things--may be21 more likely to yield to “22conditioning”23 and transformations (though perhaps only for a limited time) than the human condition which under all circumstances seems to remain28 the condition under29 which life on earth is given30 to man at all31.
21
Compared with the1 French existentialist approach2, modern German philosophers, especially Jaspers and Heidegger3 concern with politics is much less direct and even more elusive in4 the sense that neither5 of them holds on to either political convictions or specific philosophical tenets about politics. What both of them6 have been trying almost from their beginnings, though7 in radically different and frequently diametrically opposite ways8, has been much rather to develop a phi[gap]osophy which would take proper account of the fact that man, among other things, ia a political being in the old Aristotelian sense9. There is no doubt that present political events forced them into such considerations; but10 their more important contributions do not lie11 in those works12 or articles in which they treated of13 contemporary problems directly14 (Jaspers’ Geist der Zeit or Heidegger’s university speec15[gap] of 1933), but in their philosophies themselves16.	Compared with French existentialism2, the3 concern with politics in modern German philosophy, where4 the names5 of Jaspers and Heidegger6 have been in the foreground for more than 30 years8, is less direct and more elusive. Political convictions hardly play any role there and even specific philosophic tenets about politics are conspicuously absent9. Whatever contributions they may have made to a political philosophy must be looked for in10 their philosophies themselves rather than11 in books12 or articles in which they take position with respect to13 contemporary eventsexplicitly or implicitly14 (and then always somewhat equivocally) in critical analyses15 of the “spiritual situation of the time”16.15)17	Compared with French existentialism2, the3 concern with politics in modern German philosophy, where4 the names5 of Jaspers and Heidegger6 have been in the foreground for more than 40 years8, is less direct and more elusive. Political convictions hardly play any role there and even specific philosophic tenets about politics are conspicuously absent9. Whatever contributions they may have made to a political philosophy must be looked for in10 their philosophies themselves rather than11 in books12 or articles in which they explicitly take position with respect to13 contemporary events or implicitly14 (and then always somewhat equivocally) in critical analyses15 of the “spiritual situation of the time”16.15)17	Compared with French existentialism2, the3 concern with politics in modern German philosophy, where4 the names5 of Jaspers and Heidegger6 have been in the foreground for more than 30 years8, is less direct and more elusive. Political convictions hardly play any role there and even specific philosophic tenets about politics are conspicuously absent9. Whatever contributions they may have made to a political philosophy must be looked for in10 their philosophies themselves rather than11 in books12 or articles in which they explicitly take position with respect to13 contemporary events or implicitly14 (and then always somewhat equivocally) in critical analyses15 of the “spiritual situation of the time”16.15)17
22
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	Among all the philosophers whom we have considered here, Jaspers occupies a unique position because he alone is a convinced disciple of Kant. This, in our context, carries special weight. Kant belongs to the few philosophers to whom the remark of Pascal which I quoted above does not apply. Of the three famous Kantian questions: “What can I know? What shall2 I do? What3 may I hope?”, the second possesses in Kant’s own work a key position. Kant’s so-called moral philosophy is in essence political, insofar as he attributes to all men those capacities of legislating and judging which according to the tradtion4 had been the prerogative of the statesman. Moral activity, according to Kant, is legislation -- to act in such a way that the principle of my action could become a general law -- and to be a man of good will (his definition of a good man) means to be constantly concerned, not with obedience to existing laws, but with legislating. The guiding political principle of this legislating moral activity is the idea of mankind.	Among all the philosophers whom we have considered here, Jaspers occupies [metamark (text connection)]a unique position because he alone is a convinced disciple of Kant. This, in our context, carries a1 special weight. Kant belongs to the few philosophers to whom the remark of Pascal which I quoted above does not apply. Of the three famous Kantian questions: “What can I know? What ought2 I do? Whay3 may I hope?”, the second possesses in Kant’s own work a key position. Kant’s so-called moral philosophy is in essence political, insofar as he attributes to all men those capacities of legislating and judging which according to the tradition4 had been the prerogative of the statesman. Moral activity, according to Kant, is legislation--to act in such a way that the principle of my action could become a general law--and to be a man of good will (his definition of a good man) means to be constantly concerned, not with obedience to existing laws, but with legislating. The guiding political principle of this legislating moral activity is the idea of mankind.	Among all the philosophers whom we have considered here, Jaspers occupies a unique position because he alone is a convinced disciple of Kant. This, in our context, carries a1 special weight. Kant belongs to the few philosophers to whom the remark of Pascal which I quoted above does not apply. Of the three famous Kantian questions: “What can I know? What shall2 I do? What3 may I hope?”, the second possesses in Kant’s own work a key position. [metamark (text connection)]Kant’s so-called moral philosophy is in essence political, insofar as he attributes to all men those capacities of legislating and judging which according to the tradition4 had been the prerogative of the statesman. Moral activity, according to Kant, is legislation--to act in such a way that the principle of my action could become a general law--and to be a man of good will (his definition of a good man) means to be constantly concerned, not with obedience to existing laws, but with legislating. The guiding political principle of this legislating moral activity is the idea of mankind.
23
Jaspers’ most important contribution to modern political philosophy lies in his definition of truth as communication1, and in his use2 of this interpretation for3 the new planetary political situation in which mankind is no longer a4 dream or a concept, but5 an everpresent urgent reality. Kant once called upon the historians of his time9 to write a history “10in weltbürgerlicher Absicht”. One could easily show that Jaspers’ whole philosophical work was conceived with such a “cosmopolitan intention”. Truth in his philosophy can never be grasped as dogmatic content, but emerges only11 as existential substance clarified and articulted through reason, communicating itself and appealing to the reasonable existence of the other A philosophical foundation for the already existing reality of mankind, i.e. a situation where no event of any importance in one country can remain a marginal accident12 in the other, lies in the the attitude which Jaspers calls13 “limitless communication”, an attitude |13 that14 implies the15 faith in the comprehensibility of all truths and16 the good will to reveal and to,17 listen as the primary condition for19 human being-together20. Communication, in other words,21 is not conceived as22 “expressing23” thoughts or feelings, and therefore being25 secondary to them; and26 truth itself is communicative, it27 disappears outside communication. Thinking therefore28 insofar as it must necessarily end in communication if it is to attain to any truth29 becomes pracitcal30, though not pragmatic; it31 is a practice between men rather than the performance of one individual in his self-chosen solitude. Jaspers, as far as I know, is the only philosopher who ever protested against solitude, to whom solitude appeared32 “pernicious” and who questions33 “all thoughts, all experiences, all contents” according34 to this one criterion:35 “What do36 they sig nify for communication?37 Are they such that they may help or such that they will prevent communication? Do they seduce to38 solitude or arouse to39 communication?” Philosophy, here, has lost its humility before40 the revealed truths of religion41, because it feels that only through a communication between these truths can emerge what humanly speaking42 truth can be, namely not One truth43 for all men, but an intercommunication between men, so that what44 each of them believed45 in his separation and46 isolation from all others can become humanly true47. And philosophy48 has lost also49 its arrogance towards50 the common life of man. It has51 become ancilla vitae in the sense in which Kant once conceived of53 it--in order “to54 carry the torch in front of her gracious lady rather than the train of her dress behind.”	For Jaspers, not unlike Gilson1, the decisive political event2 of our time is3 the emergence of mankind from its purely spiritual existence as an utopian4 dream or a guiding principle into5 an everpresent urgent political6 reality. What7 Kant therefore8 once the philosophic task of future historians,9 to write a history “10in weltbürgerlicher Absicht” (with a cosmopolitan intent) |15 16), Jaspers has recently been trying to do from a philosophical point of view, i.e. to present a world history of philosophy11 as the proper foundation for a world-wide political body.17) This, in turn, has been possible only because in Jaspers’ philosophy communication constitutes the “existential” center and becomes actually identical with truth. The adequate attitude of philosophic man12 in the new planetary situation is that of13 “limitless communication,” which14 implies faith in the comprehensibility of all truths together with16 the good will to reveal and to listen as primary conditions of authentic19 human being-together20. Communication is not an22 “expression23” of24 thoughts or feelings, which then could only be25 secondary to them, but26 truth itself is communicative and27 disappears outside communication. Thinking,28 insofar as it must necessarily end in communication if it is to attain to truth at all,29 becomes practical30, though not pragmatic. It31 is a practice between men rather than the performance of one individual in his self-chosen solitude. Jaspers, as far as I know, is the only philosopher who ever protested against solitude, to whom solitude appears32 “pernicious” and who even wants to examine33 “all thoughts, all experiences, all contents” as34 to “what36 they signify for communication.37 Are they such that they may help or such that they will prevent communication? Do they solitude or arouse communication?”[metamark x|]17a) Philosophy here becomes40 the mediator between many truths41, not only because it holds the one42 truth valid43 for all men, but because only in reasoned communication can that which44 each man may believe45 in his isolation from all others humanly and actually become “true”47. Here, too -- albeit in a different way -- hilosophy48 has lost its arrogance toward50 the common life of men; it tends to51 become ancilla vitae for every- body52 in the sense in which Kant once conceived it, namely “54carry the torch in front of her gracious lady rather than the train of her dress behind.”17b)55	For Jaspers, not unlike Gilson1, the decisive political event2 of our time is3 the emergence of mankind from its purely spiritual existence as an utopian4 dream or a guiding principle into5 an everpresent urgent political6 reality. What7 Kant therefore8 once called the philosophic task of future historians9 to write a history “10in weltbürgerlicher Absicht” (with a cosmopolitan intention)16), Jaspers in a way has recently been trying to do from a philosophical point of view, i.e. to present a world history of philosophy11 as the proper foundation for a world-wide political body.17) This, in turn, has been possible only because in Jaspers’ philosophy communication constitutes the “existential” center and becomes actually identical with truth. The adequate attitude of philosophic man12 in the new planetary situation is that of13 “limitless communication”, which14 implies faith in the comprehensibility of all truths together with16 the good will to reveal and to listen to18 as primary conditions of authentic19 human intercourse20. Communication is not an22 “expression23” of24 thoughts or feelings, which then could only be25 secondary to them, but26 truth itself is communicative and27 disappears outside communication. Thinking,28 insofar as it must necessarily end in communication if it is to attain to truth at all,29 becomes practical30, though not pragmatic. It31 is a practice between men rather than the performance of one individual in his self-chosen solitude. Jaspers, as far as I know, is the only philosopher who ever protested against solitude, to whom solitude appears32 “pernicious” and who even wants to examine33 “all thoughts, all experiences, all contents” as34 to “what36 they signify for communition.37 Are they such that they may help or such that they will prevent communication |11 ? Do they seduce to38 solitude or arouse communication?”17a Philosophy here becomes40 the mediator between many truths41, not because it holds the one42 truth valid43 for all men, but because only in reasoned communication can humanly and actually become “true” what44 each man may believe45 in his isolation from all others. Here too--albeit in a different way--philosophy48 has lost its arrogance toward50 the common life of men; it tends to51 become ancilla vitae for everybody52 in the sense in which Kant once conceived it, namely to54 carry the torch in front of her gracious lady rather than the train of her dress behind.”17b)55	For Jasper, not unlike Gilson1, the decisive political event2 of our time is3 the emergence of mankind from its purely spiritual existence as an utopian4 dream or a guiding principle into5 an everpresent urgent political6 reality. What7 Kant therefore8 once called the philosophic task of future historians,9 to write a history in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (with a cosmopolitan intentetion |15 )16), Jaspers in a way has recently been trying to do from a philosophical point of view, i.e. to present a world history of philosophy11 as the proper foundation for a world-wide political body.17) This, in turn, has been possible only because in Jaspers’ philosophy communication constitutes the “existential” center and becomes actually identical with truth. The adequate attitude of philosophic man12 in the new planetary situation is that of13 “limitless communication,” which14 implies faith in the comprehensibility of all truths together with16 the good will to reveal and to listen to18 as primary conditions of authentic19 human being-together20. Communication is not an22 “expression23” of24 thoughts or feelings, which then could only be25 secondary to them, but26 truth itself is communicative and27 disappears outside communication. Thinking,28 insofar as it must necessarily end in communication if it is to attain to truth at all,29 becomes practical30, though not pragmatic. It31 is a practice between men rather than the performance of one individual in his self-chosen solitude. Jaspers, as far as I know, is the only philosopher who ever protested against solitude, to whom solitude appears32 “pernicious” and who even wants to examine33 “all thoughts, all experiences, all contents” as34 to “what36 they signify for communication.37 Are they such that they may help or such that they will prevent communication? Do they seduce to38 solitude or arouse communication?”17a Philosophy here becomes40 the mediator between many truths41, not because it holds the one42 truth valid43 for all men, but because only in reasoned communication can humanly and actually become “true” what44 each man may believe45 in his isolation from all others. Here too--albeit in a different way hilosophy48 has lost its arrogance toward50 the common life of men; it tends to51 become ancilla vitae for every- body52 in the sense in which Kant once conceived it, namely to “54carry the torch in front of her gracious lady rather than the train of her dress behind.”17b)55
24
It can be easily1 seen that Jaspers’ cosmopolitan philosophy stands at2 the opposite end3 of the answer given by Gilson and Catholic thinkers to the problems4 of a united mankind5. Gilson maintains: “Reason is what divides6 us; faith is what unites us.7” and this8 is true if he9 consider reason as the solitary10 capacity of11 each of us, who12 when he starts13 to think in earnest14 outside the beaten path of public opinion will15 necessarily arrive at strictly individual results. (The opposite idea16 that reason tells all of us17 automatically the same assumes a miracle18 of coincidence which is similar to that which allegedly happened in the translation of the Bilble into Greek by 70 translators producing one text19.) Faith, on the other hand which21 is bound to something which is revealed from the outside allegedly to all men obviously can bring all men to recognize |14 together22 in the recognition of one truth. Against23 this société universelle, where the uniting factor24 would not exist25 between men26 but come and force with equal authority27 all under one principle, stands28 Jaspers’ position where reason itself29 can become a bond between (and not above)31 men, because it is conceived of having the principle of communication in itself32. We have only to remind ourselve33 of the twofold political34 definition of man in Aristotle;35 that man is a dzôn36 politikon and as such37 logon echôn38, that man39 insofar as he is “40political”41 has the faculty of speech and42 the power of making43 himself understood, so44 that the affairs45 of the polis can be manages without violence and47 the muteness which is48 the hallmarks of all violence--to understand that Jaspers’ definitions hark back to49 the very origins50 of our tradition51 of political thought (or52 experience) which is not necessarily53 the same as our tradition philosophical thought and54 experience.	It can easily be1 seen that Jaspers’ cosmopolitan philosophy though it starts2 the same problem3 of the actuality of mankind, takes an opposite position from that4 of Gilson and other Catholic thinkers5. Gilson maintains: “Reason is what divides6 us; |16 faith is what unites us,7”18) which, of course,8 is true if we9 consider reason to be a solidary10 capacity, inherent in11 each of us, when we begin13 to think outside the beaten path of public opinion we15 necessarily arrive at strictly individual results. (The notion16 that an innate reason will tell17 automatically the same to all men , pervert the faculty18 of reason into a purely formal mechanism, a “thinking machine”, presupposes a kind of miracle, which actually never happens19 .) Faith understood as the opposite of this subjectivistic reason20, not unlike the senses,21 is bound to some “objective” reality which can unite men from the outside, through “revelation,”22 in the recognition of one truth. The trouble with23 this uniting factor in a future universal society24 would be that it never exists25 between men ,26 but above men; that, politically speaking, it would force27 all with equal authority [metamark all under one principle.] The advantage of28 Jaspers’ position is that reason29 can become a universal30 bond because it is neither entirely within nor necessarily above31 men, but, at least in its practical reality, between them. Reason that does not want to communicate is already “unreasonable”32. We have only to remain ourselves33 of the twofold definition of man in Aristotle --35 that man is dzôon36 politikon and logon echôn38, that insofar as he is political he41 has the faculty of speech,42 the power to understand, to make43 himself understood and to persuade -- in order to realize44 that Jaspers’ definitions45 of reason hark back to very old and authentic political experiences. On46 the other hand, it seems rather obvious that “communication”,47 the term as well as48 the underlying experience, has its roots, not in the public-political sphere, but in49 the personal encounter50 of I and Thou, and this relationship51 of pure dialogue is closer to the original52 experience of the thinking dialogue in solitude than any other. By53 the same token, it contains less specifically political54 experience than almost any relationship in our average everyday lives55.	It can easily be1 seen that Jaspers’ cosmopolitan philosophy, though it starts from2 the same problem3 of the actuality of mankind, takes an opposite position from that4 of Gilson and other Catholic thinkers5. Gilson maintains: “Reason is what divides6 us; faith is what unites us,7”18) which, of course,8 is true if we9 consider reason to be a solitary10 capacity, inherent in11 each of us, who12 when we begin13 to think outside the beaten path of public opinion will15 necessarily arrive at strictly individual results. (The notion16 that an innate reason will tell17 automatically the same to all men either perverts the faculty18 of reason into a purely formal mechanism, a “thinking machine”, or presupposes a kind of miracle, which actually never happens19.) Faith understood as the opposite of this subjectivistic reason20, not unlike the senses,21 is bound to some “objective” reality which can unite men from the outside, through “revelation”,22 in the recognition of one truth. The trouble with23 this uniting factor in a future universal society24 would be that it never exists25 between,26 but above men, that politically speaking, it would force27 all with equal authority under one principle. The advantage of28 Jaspers’ position is that reason29 can become a universal30 bond because it is neither entirely within nor necessarily above31 men, but, at least in its practical reality, between them. Reason that does not want to communicate is already “unreasonable”32. We have only to remind ourselves33 of the twofold definition of man in Aristotle--35that man is dzôon36 politikon and logon echo [metamark |][metamark ₰]n38, that insofar as he is political he41 has the faculty of speech,42 the power to understand, to make43 himself understood and to persuade--in order to realize44 that Jaspers’ definitions45 of reason hark back to very old and authentic political experiences. On46 the other hand, it seems rather obvious that “communication”,47 the term as well as48 the underlying experience, has its roots, not in the public-political sphere, but in49 the personal encounter50 of I and Thou, and this relationship51 of pure dialogue is closer to the original52 experience of the thinking dialogue in solitude than any other. By53 the same token, it contains less specifically political54 experience than almost any relationship in our average everyday lives55.	It can easily be1 seen that Jaspers’ cosmopolitan philosophy, though it starts from2 the same problem3 of the actuality of mankind, takes an opposite position from that4 of Gilson and other Catholic thinkers5. Gilson maintains: “Reason is what devides6 us; |16 faith is what unites us,7”18) which, of course,8 is true if we9 consider reason to be a solitary10 capacity, inherent in11 each of us, who12 when we begin13 to think outside the beaten path of public opinion will15 necessarily arrive at strictly individual results. [metamark (text connection)](The notion16 that an innate reason will tell17 automatically the same to all men either perverts the faculty18 of reason into a purely formal mechanism, a “thinking machine”, or presupposes a kind of miracle which actually never happens19.) Faith understood as the opposite of this subjectivistic reason20, not unlike the senses,21 is bound to some “objective” reality which can unite men from the outside, through “revelation,”22 in the recognition of one truth. The trouble with23 this uniting factor in a future universal society24 would be that it never exists25 between,26 but above men, that, politically speaking, it would force27 all with equal authority under one principle. The advantage of28 Jaspers’ position is that reason29 can become a universal30 bond because it is neither entirely within nor necessarily above31 men, but, at least in its practical reality, between them. Reason that does not want to communicate is already “unreasonable”32. We have only to remind ourselves33 of the twofold definition of man in Aristotle--35that man is dzôon36 politikon and logon echõn38, that insofar as he is political he41 has the faculty of speech,42 the power to understand, to make43 himself understood and to persuade--in order to realize44 that Jaspers’ definitions45 of reason hark back to very old and authentic political experiences. On46 the other hand, it seems rather obvious that “communication”,47 the term as well as48 the underlying experience, has its roots, not in the public-political sphere, but in49 the personal encounter50 of I and Thou, and this relationship51 of pure dialogue is closer to the original52 experience of the thinking dialogue in solitude than any other. By53 the same token, it contains less specifically political54 experience than almost any relationship in our average everyday lives55.
25
It is almost impossible to render a clear account1 of those thought of Heidegger which may be of political relevance without an elaborate report on his concept and analysis of “world”2. This is all3 the more impossible as H. himself has never made articulate the implications of his philosophy4 in this direction, and in some instances, has5 even used terms and connotations which are quite apt to mislead6 the reader into believing that he deals here with the7 the old prejudice8 of the philosopher against politics9 as such or the modern rashness of escaping from philosophy into politics. The former10 is evidenced in Heidegger’s much used analyses of the “Man11, of public opinion or the others, as against the self and his authentic being, according to which the public reality has the purpose to hide the true realities and prevent12 the appearance13 of truth. The latter may find its support in the interpretation of Entschlossenheit (resolute-ness?) which since it is understood14 as a state of being seems to lack an object. Much more important than these concepts is H.’ definition of human being15 as Being-in-the-world and his insistence to analyze everyday life in its ontological significance, as well as his awareness16 that traditional philosophy has always passed beyond and neglected the immediacy of these structures. It is precisely because H18. understands human existence primarily as being thrown into and being-in-and-of-the-world19 that he,20 in his earlier |15 writings,21 has studiously avoided the term Man and,22 in his later essays used instead23 the term:25 the mortals. What is important in our context27 is not the emphasized28 mortality, but the plural itself. It always has been one29 of the decisive handicaps of philosophy to in its dealings with politics that it spoke of man in the singular, as though there such a thing as one human nature, or originally One man inhabiting the earth30. The trouble has always been that31 the whole political sphere32 of human life exists only because of the plurality of men33, because of the fact One man would34 be not human at all. In other words, all problems of political philosophy begin where traditional philosophy with its concept of man in the singular stops35.	The limitations1 of Jaspers’ philosophy with respect to politics are essentially due to the problem which has plagued political philosophy almost throughout its history2. It lies in3 the nature of philosophy that it deals with man4 in the singular, whereas politics could not5 even be conceived of if men did did not exist in6 the plural. Or to put it another way:7 the |17 experiences8 of the philosopher insofar9 as he is a philosopher are with solitude, which for man insofar as he10 is political is an essential11, nevertheless marginal experience. It may be -- but I shall only hint at this -- that Heidegger’s concept of “orld ” , which in many respects stands in12 the center13 of his philosophy, constitutes one step out of this difficulty. At any rate, it is because Heidegger defines human existence14 as being-in-the-world that he insists on giving philosophic significance to those structures of everyday life which are completely incomprehensible if man is not primarily understood15 as being together with others. And Heidegger himself has been very much aware of the fact16 that traditional philosophy “17has always passed beyond [metamark x)]and neglected”19) that which was most immediately apparent18. It is for the same reason19 that Heidegger20 in his earlier writings has studiously avoided the term an while22 in his later essays he is inclined to borrow from23 the Greeks the24 term,25 the mortals. What is important here27 is not the emphasis on28 mortality, but the use29 of the plural30. However since Heidegger has never articulated31 the implications32 of his position on this point33 , it may34 be presumptuous to read too much significance into his use of the plural35.	The limitations1 of Jaspers’ philosophy with respect to politics are essentially due to the problem which has plagued political philosophy almost throughout its history2. It lies in3 the nature of philosophy that it deals with man4 in the singular whereas politics could not5 even be conceived of if men did not exist in6 the plural. Or to put it another way:7 the experiences8 of the philosopher insofar9 as he is a philosopher are with solitude, which for man insofar as he10 is political is an essential11, nevertheless marginal experience. |12 It may be--but I shall only hint at this--that Heidegger’s concept of “world”, which in many respects stands in12 the center13 of his philosophy, constitutes one step out of this difficulty. At any rate, it is because Heidegger defines human existence14 as being-in-the-world that he insists on giving philosophic significance to those structures of everyday life which are completely incomprehensible if man is not primarily understood15 as being together with others. And Heidegger himself has been very much aware of the fact16 that traditional philosophy “17has always passed beyond and neglected”19) that which was most immediately apparent18. It is for the same reason19 that Heidegger20 in his earlier writings has studiously avoided the term “man” while22 in his later essays he is inclined to borrow from23 the Greeks the24 term “25the mortals”26. What is important here27 is not the emphasis on28 mortality, but the use29 of the plural30. However since Heidegger has never articulated31 the implications32 of his position on this point33, it may34 be presumptuous to read too much significance into his use of the plural35.	The limitations1 of Jaspers’ philosophy with respect to politics are essentially due to the problem which has plagued political philosophy almost throughout its history2. It lies in3 the nature of philosophy that it deals with man4 in the singular whereas politics could not5 even be conceived of if men did did not exist in6 the plural. Or to put it another way:7 the |17 experiences8 of the philosopher insofar9 as he is a philosopher are with solitude, which for man insofar as he10 is political is an essential11, nevertheless marginal experience. It may be--but I shall only hint at this--that Heidegger’s concept of “orld”, which in many respects stands in12 the center13 of his philosophy, constitutes one step out of this difficulty. At any rate, it is because Heidegger defines human existence14 as being-in-the-world that he insists on giving philosophic significance to those structures of everyday life which are completely incomprehensible if man is not primarily understood15 as being together with others. And Heidegger himself has been very much aware of the fact16 that traditional philosophy “17has always passed beyond and neglected”19) average, everyday life18 . It is for the same reason19 that in his earlier writings he21 has studiously avoided the term “an” while22 in his later essays he is inclined to borrow from23 the Greeks the24 term “25the mortals ”26 . What is important here27 is not the emphasis on28 mortality, but the use29 of the plural30. However since Heidegger has never articulated31 the implications32 of his position on this point33, it may34 be presumptuous to read too much significance into it35.
26
The differences between these various concerns with politics are more striking than what they have in common. If one wanted to bring them into communication with each other, it is to be feared that they would not even be able to establish enough contact to fight or oppose each other. Wherever discussions in recent years between the philosophers took place, the philosophic chaos became clearer than ever before, except when an outspoken and possibly vulgarized Marxian concept and hostility against philosophy as such could prescribe the rules and the problems, establishing for a fleeting deceptive moment a seeming solidarity beteen the schools. Something similar could also happen when all these schools together were confronted with a philosophical approach which believes philosophy to be one of the sciences, and specifically to consist in logics or semantics. But this, too, would be an entirely negative solidarity. In both instances, it would be a question of saving philosophy, not a communication of philosophic viewpoints.	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]
27
It1 may be that one of3 the chief reasons for this chaotic situation, which harbors its own productive potentialities4, is that6 the philosopher because of the political transformation of the world has begun to doubt his own function in human society such7 as traditional philosophy prescribed it to him. I mentioned above that the proverbial ivory tower of philosopher is no longer claimed by any8 of them9. Another way of saying10 the same thing would be that no philosopher any longer |16 even wants to be assigned11 the role12 of the wise man. The question is whether this self-doubt, more than any other single element13, has prevented the rise of a new political philosophy14. The question for the philosopher today is whether15 such a thing as philosophy is16 possible at all under the circumstances of the emerging18 modern world. In this sense, the concern with politics has become a life-or-death matter for philosophy itself, and19 the seriousness20 of this struggle shows itself of course much clearer21 in contemporary German philosophy than in French existentialism which has, in a22 sense, escaped from23 philosophy altogether24.	Among the more disturbing aspects of contemporary philosophy1 may well2 be that the differences between3 the various schools and individuals are so much more striking than they have in common. Whenever discussions between them take place4, the philosophic chaos5 is likely to dominate6 the scene to such an extent that not even significant opposition is possible. To the outsider, however, it frequently appears7 as though all these considerations and new attempts have developed in and created an identical climate, and this observation contains a certain amount8 of truth9. What they have in common is10 the conviction of the relevance of philosophy as opposed to those who try to bagatellize11 the urgency12 of philosophic questions and to substitute for them some kind of science or pseudo-science, such as Marxian materialism13, or psychoanalysis or logistics or semantics or what not14. |18 And this negative solidarity against fashion of the time draws its strength from one common fear, , lest15 such a thing as philosophy and philosophizing be16 possible and meaningful17 at all under the circumstances of the modern world. I mentioned above that philosophy has left its proverbial ivory tower and the philosopher abandoned his claim to19 the position20 of “wise man” within society. Inherent21 in this abandonment of the traditional position is also a self-doubt about the viability of philosophy in the modern world and in this22 sense, concern with politics has become a life-or-death matter for23 philosophy itself24.	Among the more disturbing aspects of contemporary philosophy1 may well2 be that the differences between3 the various schools and individuals are so much more striking than what they have in common. Whenever discussions between them take place4, the philosophic chaos5 is likely to dominate6 the scene to such an extent that not even significant opposition is possible. To the outsider, however, it frequently appears7 as though all these considerations and new attempts have developed in and created an identical climate, and this observation contains a certain amount8 of truth9. What they have in common is10 the conviction of the relevance of philosophy as opposed to all those who try to bagatellize11 the urgency12 of philosophic questions and to substitute for them some kind of science or pseudo-science, such as Marxian materialism13, or psychoanalysis or logistics or semantics or what not14. And this negative solidarity against current fashions[metamark |][metamark ₰] draws its strength from one common fear lest15 such a thing as philosophy and philosophizing be16 possible and meaningful17 at all under the circumstances of the modern world. I mentioned above that philosophy has left its proverbial ivory tower and the philosopher abandoned his claim to19 the position20 of “wise man” within society. Inherent21 in this abandonment of the traditional position is also a self-doubt about the viability of philosophy and in this22 sense, concern with politics has become a life-or-death matter for23 philosophy itself24.	Among the more disturbing aspects of contemporary philosophy1 may well2 be that the differences between3 the various schools and individuals are so much more striking than what they have in common. Whenever discussions between them take place4, the philosophic chaos5 is likely to dominate6 the scene to such an extent that not even significant opposition is possible. To the outsider, however, it frequently appears7 as though all these considerations and new attempts have developed in and created an identical climate, and this observation contains a certain amount8 of truth9. What they have in common is10 the conviction of the relevance of philosophy as opposed to all those who try to bagatellize11 the urgency12 of philosophic questioning and to substitute for them some kind of science or pseudo-science, such as Marxian materialism13, or psychoanalysis or logistics or semantics or what not14. |18 s a kind of negative solidarity against current fashions which either want to transform philosophy into a new science or throw it out altogether as “unscientific.” Behind this lies the fear lest15 such a thing as philosophy and philosophizing be16 possible and meaningful17 at all under the circumstances of the modern world. I mentioned above that philosophy has left its proverbial ivory tower and the philosopher abandoned his claim to19 the position20 of “wise man” within society. Inherent21 in this abandonment of the traditional position is also a self-doubt about the viability of philosophy and in this22 sense, concern with politics has become a life-or-death matter =for23 philosophy itself24.
28
The point of the matter seems to be that the Hegelian escape of the philosopher from1 politics into history is no longer open. Its silent3 condition was that historical events and the stream of past happenings up to the present could make sense and disclose a4 positive meaning to the backward directed glance of the philosopher. Without at least5 the possibility to harmonize6 and thus save even7 the negative into an ultimate reconciliation8 of the spirit with reality,11 the Hegelian approach cannot even conceived of. In other words, only under the condition that nothing12 “radically13 evil” has happened is14 the Hegelian approach valid. But who15 would dare to reconcile himself with16 the reality🞽 Development of freedom: march to freedom [metamark ____] of extermination camps and slave labor through17 the game of thesis-antithesis-and synthesis? Hegel had it easy enough still with the French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte. Today18, whereever19 we find a similar reasoning, the bad faith of it is too obvious20 to carry much weight21.	The point of the matter seems to be that the Hegelian escape from concern with1 politics into an interpretation of2 history is no longer open. Its condition was that historical events and the stream of past happenings up to the present could make sense and, in all its evil and negative aspects, disclose4 positive meaning to the backward directed glance of the philosopher. Hegel could interpret5 the past of course of history in terms of a dialectical movement towards freedom,6 and understand the French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte accordingly. Today, nothing appears more questionable than that7 the course of history in and by itself is directed towards the realization8 of more and more freedom. If we think in terms of trends and tendencies,9 the opposite seems more plausible by far. Moreover, Hegel’s grandiose effort to reconcile the10 spirit with reality depends entirely on11 the possibility to harmonize and to see something good in every evil. It remains valid only as long as no12 “radical13 evil” ( of which, among14 the philosophers, again only Kant had at least the conception, though hardly a concrete experience) had happened. Who15 would dare to reconcile himself the reality of extermination camps or play17 the game of thesis-antithesis-synthesis until his dialectics have discovered “meaning” in slave labor? Wherever we find similar arguments in present philosophy18,,19 we remain either unconvinced because of th e inherent ir ? reality or we begin20 to suspect bad faith21.	The point of the matter seems to be that the Hegelian escape from concern with1 politics into an interpretation of2 history is no longer open. Its silent3 condition was that historical events and the stream of past happenings up to the present could make sense and, in all its evil aspects by virtue of the Hegelian “power of negative,” disclose4 positive meaning to the backward directed glance of the philosopher. Hegel could interpret5 the past course of history in terms of a dialectical movement towards freedom,6 and understand the French Revolution and Napoelon Bonaparte accordingly. Today, nothing appears more questionable than that7 the course of history in and by itself is directed towards the realization8 of more and more freedom. If we think in terms of trends and tendencies,9 the opposite |13 seems by far more plausible. Moreover, Hegel’s grandiose effort to reconcile the10 spirit with reality depended entirely on11 the possibility to harmonize and to see something good in every evil. It remains valid only as long as [metamark |]no12 “radical13 evil” (of which, among14 the philosophers, again only Kant had at least the conception, though hardly a concrete experience) had happened. Who15 would dare to reconcile himself with16 the reality of extermination camps or play17 the game of thesis-antithesis-synthesis until his dialectics have discovered “meaning” in slave labor? Wherever we find similar arguments in present philosophy18, we remain either unconvinced because of the inherent lack of sense for reality or we begin20 to suspect bad faith21.	The point of the matter seems to be that the Hegelian escape from concern with1 politics into an interpretation of2 history is no longer open. Its silent3 condition was that historical events and the stream of past happenings up to the present could make sense and, in all its evil and negative aspects, disclose4 positive meaning to the backward directed glance of the philosopher. Hegel could interpret5 the past course of history in terms of a dialectical movement towards freedom,6 and understand the French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte accordingly. Today, nothing appears more questionable than that7 the course of history in and by itself is directed towards the realization8 of more and more freedom. If we think in terms of trends and tendencies,9 the opposite seems by far more plausible. Moreover, Hegel’s grandiose effort to reconcile the10 spirit with reality depended entirely on11 the possibility to harmonize and to see something good in every evil. It remains valid only as long as no12 “radical13 evil” (of which, among14 the philosophers, again only Kant had at least the conception, though hardly a concrete experience) had happened. Who15 would dare to reconcile himself with16 the reality of extermination camps or play17 the game of thesis-antithesis-synthesis until his dialectics have discovered “meaning” in slave labor? Wherever we find similar arguments in present philosophy18, we remain either unconvinced because of the inherent lack of sense for reality or we begin20 to suspect bad faith21.
29
🞽 It led H. to an emphasis on Event. In other words, the sheer horror of comb.1 political events together with the even more horrible eventualities of the future is behind all the philosophies we mentioned. It seems to me characteristic, however,4 that not one of the philosophers5 has mentioned thus far the background of experience from which he drew those conclusions which are no longer6 in harmony with the philosophical tradition7 of the past8. If we look at political philosophy9 as a whole, or rather at the curious attitude of10 the philosophers towards politics in which all political philosophies nece ssarily have their roots11, it is as though12 the ancient13 refusal to grant to the political realm that amount of14 thaumadzein, of wondering15 at that what is as it is, which according to Plato and Aristotle |17 is the beginning of philosophy and which they and those who came after them gave freely21 to all other realms of life and being, has been carried into22 the present under the disguise not to admit23 the speechless horror at that24 what man can25 do and at26 what the world may become. For wonder and horror are somehow related, like the opposites of27 the same thing28.	In other words, the sheer horror of contemporary1 political events,2 |19 together with the even more horrible eventualities of the future,3 is behind all the philosophies we mentioned. It seems to me characteristic that not one of the philosophies5 has mentioned or analyzed6 in philosophical terms this background7 of experience8. It is9 as though in this refusal to own up to10 the experience of horror and take it seriously11, the philosophers have inherited12 the traditional13 refusal to grant to the realm of human affairs that14 thaumadzein, that wonder15 at that what is,16 as it is, which,17 according to Plato and Aristotle,18 is at19 the beginning of all20 philosophy and which even they already refused21 to accept as22 the preliminary condition for political philosophy. For23 the speechless horror what man may25 do and what the world may become is in many ways related to the speechless wonder of gratitude from which27 the questions of philosophy spring28.	In other words, the sheer horror of contemporary1 political events,2 together with the even more horrible eventualities of the future is behind all the philosophies we mentioned. It seems to me characteristic that not one of the philosophers5 has mentioned or analyzed6 in philosophical terms this background7 of experience8. It is9 as though in this refusal to own up to10 the experience of horror and take it seriously11, the philosophers have inherited12 the traditional13 refusal to grant to the realm of human affairs that14 thaumadzein, that wonder15 at that what is as it is, which,17 according to Plato and Aristotle,18 is at19 the beginning of all20 philosophy and which even they already refused21 to accept as22 the preliminary condition for political philosophy. For23 the speechless horror at that24 what man may25 do and what the world may become is in many ways related to the speechless wonder of gratitude from which27 the questions of philosophy spring28.	In other words, the sheer horror of contemporary1 political events, |19 and that the philosopher ’s argument against action--“its origin is unknown, its consequences are unknown therefore, has action any value at all?”--is not valid.2 together with the even more horrible eventualities of the future is behind all the philosophies we mentioned. It seems to me characteristic that not one of the philosophers5 has mentioned or analyzed6 in philosophical terms this background7 of experience8. It is9 as though in this refusal to own up to10 the experience of horror and take it seriously11, the philosophers have inherited12 the traditional13 refusal to grant to the realm of human affairs that14 thaumadzein, that wonder15 at that what is as it is, which,17 according to Plato and Aristotle,18 is at19 the beginning of all20 philosophy and which even they already refused21 to accept as22 the preliminary condition for political philosophy. For23 the speechless horror at that24 what man may25 do and what the world may become is in many ways related to the speechless wonder of gratitude from which27 the questions of philosophy spring28.
30
Most1 of the prerequisites2 for a new political philosophy, which cant be anything else but a reformulation3 of the philosopher’s attitude to4 the political realm of life6 or of the relationship between thought an7 action, are8 already there9, even though10 they may appear rather as elimination of sacred13 obstacles than as14 the building15 of new fundaments. To these prerequisites do belong the liquidation16 of the position of the wise man from the side of the philosopher and the recognition that17 truth and communication are essentially, humanly speaking18, the same, insofar19 as truthfulness is20 the good will to “limitless communication”; together with these must go21 the awareness of the essential dignity22 of human affairs which lies in the significance of average everyday life and23 its world as it lies in the new meaningfulness of action as the possibility to start anew, to make24 a new beginning. All this25 will, among other things, lead to a reexamination of26 the old question: What is thinking? and which is its political significance, namely which is27 the significance28 of thought and which its conditions29 for a being that never exists in the singular and whose plurality is by30 far not31 explored when an I-Thou relationship has been established as in Jaspers theory32 of communication. All these questions and reexaminations33 need to remain in contact with the classical questions of political34 thought and the answers given throughout the centuries if35 they are not36 to lose their specific weight and meaning37 in the Western tradition38.	Many1 of the prerequisites2 for a new political philosophy, which in all likelihood will consist in the re-formulation3 of the philosopher’s attitude toward4 the political realm or5 of the connection between man as a philosophical and as a political being6 or of the relationship between thought and7 action, already exist9, although10 they may appear at first glance11 rather as the12 elimination of traditional13 obstacles than than14 the erection15 of new fundaments. Among them is Jaspers’ reformulation16 of truth and Heidegger’s analyses of average everyday life18, as well as20 the French existentialists’ insistence on action against21 the old suspicions22 of the philosophers -- “its origin is unknown,23 its consequences are unknown: therefore has action any value at all?”20) Crucial for24 a new political philosophy25 will be an inquiry into26 the political significance of thought, i.e. into the meaningfulness and27 the conditions28 of thinking29 for a being that never exists in the singular and whose plurality is far from31 explored when an I-Thou-relationship is added to the traditional understanding32 of man and human nature. Such re-examinations33 need to remain in contact with the classical questions of politcal34 thought |20 as35 they are presented36 to us in many variations37 in contemporary catholic thought38.	Many1 of the prerequisities2 for a new political philosophy, which in all likelihood will consist in the re-formulation3 of the philosopher’s attitude toward4 the political realm or5 of the connection between man as a philosophical and as a political being6 or of the relationship between thought and7 action, already exist9, although10 they may appear at first glance11 rather as the12 elimination of traditional13 obstacles than the erection15 of new fundaments. Among them is Jaspers’ re-formulation16 of truth and Heidegger’s analyses of average everyday life18, as well as20 the French existentialists’ insistence on action [metamark ]which they oppose to21 the old suspicions22 of the philosophers [metamark |]against it--“its origin is unknown,23 its consequences are unknown: therefore has action any value at all?”20) Crucial for24 a new political philosophy25 will be an inquiry into26 the political significance of thought, i.e. into the meaningfulness and27 the conditions28 of thinking29 for a being that never exists in the singular and whose plurality is far from31 explored when an I-Thou-relationship is added to the traditional understanding32 of man and human nature. Such re-examinations33 need to remain in contact with the classical questions of political34 thought as35 they are presented36 to us in many variations37 in contemporary Catholic philosophy38.	=Many1 of the prerequisites2 for a new political philosophy, which in all likelihood will consist in the re-formulation3 of the philosopher’s attitude toward4 the political realm or5 of the connection between man as a philosophical and as a political being6 or of the relationship between thought and7 action, already exist9, [metamark (text connection)]although10 they may appear at first glance11 rather as the12 elimination of traditional13 obstacles than [metamark (text connection)] the erection15 of new fundaments. Among them is Jaspers’ reformulation16 of truth and Heidegger’s analyses of average everyday [metamark (text connection)]life18, as well as20 the French existentialists’ insistence on action against21 the old suspicions22 of the philosophers against it--“its origin is unknown,23 its consequences are unknown: therefore has action any value at all?”20) Crucial for24 a new political philosophy25 will be an inquiry into26 the political significance of thought, i.e. into the meaningfulness and27 the conditions28 of thinking29 for a being that never exists in the singular and whose plurality is far from31 explored when an I-Thou-relationship is added to the traditional understanding32 of man and human nature. Such re-examinations33 need to remain in contact with the classical questions of political34 thought |20 [metamark (text connection)] as35 they are presented36 to us in many variations37 in contemporary catholic philosophy38.
31
But all this are only1 prerequisites. An authentic political philosophy can2 ultimately arise only from thaumadzein3, from wonder at that what is as it is, which5 this time,6 contrary to the teaching7 of the ancients,8 must be directed at9 human affairs and human deeds. In a sense10, the philosophers are those who are worse equipped for this grateful wonder than anybody else, and therefore least qualified for polit. philos13. yet, if they dont do it, nobody14 else will.15	But all these are only1 prerequisites. An authentic political philosophy can not2 ultimately rise out of an analysis of trends3, partial compromises, re-interpretations or, on the contrary, rebellion against philosophy itself. Like all other branches of philosophy, it can spring only4 from an original act of thaumadzein whose wondering and thence questioning impulse5 this time (i.e.6 contrary to the teachings7 of the ancients)8 must grasp directly the realm of9 human affairs and human deeds. To be sure10, for11 the [metamark performance] of this act the12 philosophers, with their vested interest in being undisturbed by others and their professional experience with solitude, are not particularly well equipped13. But who [metamark would doubt that nobody]can’t you leave out this phrase?14 else is likely to succedd if they should fail us?15	But all these are only1 prerequisites. An authentic political philosophy cannot2 ultimately rise out of an analysis of trends3, partial compromises, re-interpretations or, on the contrary, rebellion against philosophy itself. Like all other branches of philosophy, it can spring only4 from an original act of thaumadzein whose wondering and thence questioning impulse5 this time (i.e.6 contrary to the teachings7 of the ancients)8 must grasp directly the realm of9 human affairs and human deeds. To be sure10, for11 the performance of this act the12 philosophers, with their vested interest in being undisturbed by others and their professional experience with solitude, are not particularly well equipped13. But who14 else is likely to succeed if they should fail us?15	But only as1 prerequisites. An authentic political philosophy can not2 ultimately rise out of an analysis of trends3, partial compromises, re-interpretations or, on the contrary, rebellion against philosophy itself. Like all other branches of philosophy, it can spring only4 from an original act of “thaumadzein whose wondering and thence questioning impulse5 this time (i.e.6 contrary to the teachings7 of the ancients)8 must come to grasp with the realm of9 human affairs and human deeds. To be sure10, for11 the performance of this act the12 philosophers, with their vested interest in being undisturbed by others and their professional experience with solitude, are not particularly well equipped13. But who14 else is likely to succedd if they should fail us.15
32
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 1) vol. 5, pocket edition Kröner, “Blicke in die Gegenwart und Zu-kunft der Völker” No. 17Cf. also Morgenröte, No. 179.	🞽 1.  Vol. 5, pocket edition Kröner, “Blicke in die Gegenwart und Zukunft der Völker” No. 17. Cf. also Morgenröte, No. 179.	🞽 1) vol. 5, pocket edition Kröner, “Blicke in die Gegenwart und Zu-kunft der Völker” No. 17 Cf. also Morgenröte, No. 179.
33
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 2) Pensées, No. 331, transl. by W.F. Trother in Harvard Classics, 1910.	🞽 2.  Pensées, No. 331, transl. by W. F. Trother in Harvard Classics, 1910.	🞽 2) Pensées, No. 331, transl. by W.F. Trother in Harvard Classics, 1910.
34
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 3) This is the title of Eric Voegelin’s new book, Chicago 195, which aims at a “restoration” of political science in the Platonic spirit.	🞽 3.  This is the title of Eric Voegelin’s new book, Chicago, 1952, which aims at a “restoration” of political science in the Platonic spirit.	🞽 3) This is the title of Eric Voegelin’s new book, Chicago 1952, which aims at a “restoration” of political science in the Platonic spirit.
35
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 4) “Das Ding” in Gestalt und Gedanke, Jahrbuch der Bayerischen Akademie der Schönen Künste, 1951, p. 146.	🞽 4.  “Das Ding” in Gestalt und Gedanke, Jahrbuch der Bayerischen Akademie der Schönen Künste, 1951, p. 146.	🞽 4) “Das Ding” in Gestalt und Gedanke, Jahrbuch der Bayerischen Akademie der Schönen Künste, 1951, p. 146.
36
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 4a.  Sein und Zeit, §26 and 27.	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]
37
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 4a)  Sein und Zeit, § 26 & 27.
38
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 5) Etienne Gilson, Les Métamorphoses de la Cité de Dieu, Louvain 1952, p. 151	🞽 5.  Etienne Gilson, Les Métamorphoses de la Cité de Dieu, Louvain 1952, p. 151.	🞽 5) Etienne Gilson, Les Métamorphoses de la Cité de Dieu, Louvain 1952, p. 151
39
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 6) Voegelin, op. cit., is a good example for a combination which is not committed to any particular Church or school. To him, Plato’s ideas as the invisible measures of the visible world are later “confirmed through the revelation of the measure itself.” cf. pp. 68-78	🞽 6.  Voegelin, op. cit., is a good example for a combination which is not committed to any particular Church or school. To him, Plato’s ideas as the invisible measures of the visible world are later “confirmed through the revelation of the measure itself.” Cf. pp. 68-78.	🞽 6) Voegelin, op. cit., is a good example for a combination which is not committed to any particular Church or school. To him, Plato’s ideas as the invisible measures of the visible world are later “confirmed through the revelation of the measure itself.” cf. pp. 68-78
40
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 7) Die Entstehung des Historismus, 1936, vol. I, p. 5	🞽 7.  Die Entstehung des Historismus, 1936, vol. I, p. 5.	🞽 7) Die Entstehung des Historismus, 1936, vol. I, p. 5
41
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 8) ibidem, vol. II, p. 394 in his discussion of Herder: “So hatte noch niemand vor ihm gelesen.”	🞽 8.  Ibid., vol. II, p. 394, in his discussion of Herder: “So hatte noch niemand vor ihm gelesen.“	🞽 8) ibidem, vol. II, p. 394 in his discussion of Herder: “So hatte noch niemand vor ihm gelesen.”
42
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 8a) Gilson, op. cit. p. 1 ff.	🞽 8a. Gilson, op. cit., p. 1 ff.	🞽 8a) Gilson, op. cit. p. 1 ff.
43
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 9) Cf. the last sentence of L’Etre et le Néant?, 1943, “Toutes ces que-stions, qui nous renvoient à la réflexion pure et non complice, ne peuvent trouver leur réponse que sur le terrain moral. Nous y consa-crerons un prochain ouvrage.”	🞽 9.  Cf. the last sentence of L’Etre et le Néant?, 1943, “Toutes ces questions, qui nous renvoient à la réflexion pure et non complice, ne peuvent trouver leur réponse que sur le terrain moral. Nous y consacrerons un prochain ouvrage.”	🞽 9) Cf. the last sentence of L’Etre et le Néant?, 1943, “Toutes ces que-stions, qui nous renvoient à la réflexion pure et non complice, ne peuvent trouver leur réponse que sur le terrain moral. Nous y consa-crerons un prochain ouvrage.”
44
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 10) Condition Humaine,	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 10) Condition Humaine,
45
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 10.  Condition Humaine	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]
46
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 11) This is the title of Camus’ last book, L’Homme Revolté, 1951	🞽 11.  This is the title of Camus’ last book, L’Homme Revolté, 1951.	🞽 11) This is the title of Camus’ last book, L’Homme Revolté, 1951
47
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 12) For the absurdity of human existence, see especially Camus’ earlier book Le Mythe de Sisyphe, Essai sur l’Absurde, 1942.	🞽 12.  For the absurdity of human existence, see especially Camus’ earlier book Le Mythe de Sisyphe, Essai sur l’Absurde, 1942.	🞽 12) For the absurdity of human existence, see especially Camus’ earlier book Le Mythe de Sisyphe, Essai sur l’Absurde, 1942.
48
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 13) Sartre pre-war novel La Nausée, 1938, is perhaps the most impressive presentation of this attitude.	🞽 13.  Sartre pre-war novel La Nausée, 1938, is perhaps the most impressive pre-sentation of this attitude.	🞽 13) Sartre pre-war novel La Nausée, 1938, is perhaps the most impressive presentation of this attitude.
49
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 13a. Everett W. Knight, “The Politics of Existentialism ” , in Twentieth Century, August 1954.	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]
50
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 13a)  Everett W. Knight, “The Po-litics of Existentialism” in Twentieth Cen-tury, Aug. 54
51
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 14) For this activistic humanism, see Sartre’s L’Existentialisme est un Humanisme and M. Merleau-Ponty’s Humanisme et Terreur, 1947.	🞽 14.  For this activistic humanism, see Sartre’s L’Existentialisme est un humanisme and M. Merleau-Ponty’s Humanisme et Terreur, 1947.	🞽 14) For this activistic humanism, see Sartre’s L’Existentialisme est un Humanisme and M. Merleau-Ponty’s Humanisme et Terreur, 1947.
52
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 15) The quotation is the title under which Jaspers published an analysis of trends in modern society in 1931. In his Vom Ursprung und Sinn der Geschichte, 1948, he devotes the second part to an interpre-tation of the modern world. Both works appeared in English. Similar concern , but of course altogether different in content, with the modern world one finds in Heidegger’s Holzwege 1950 , especially in the essay “Die Zeit des Weltbilds” which in many respects is supplement-ed and corrected in his recent lecture “Die Frage nach der Technik”, in Die Künste im Technischen Zeitalter, Jahrbuch der Bayerischen Akademie der Schönen Künste, 1954.	🞽 15.  The quotation is the title under which Jaspers published an analysis of trends in modern society in 1931. In his Vom Ursprung und Sinn der Geschichte, 1948, he devotes the second part to an interpretation of the modern world. Both works appeared in English. Similar concern with the modern world, though altogether different in content, one finds in Heidegger’s Holzwege, 1950, especially in the essay “Die Zeit des Weltbilds” which in many respects is supplemented and revised in his recent lecture “Die Frage nach der Technik”, in Die Künste im Technischen Zeitalter, Jahrbuch der Bayerischen Akademie der Schönen Künste, 1954.	🞽 15) The quotation is the title under which Jaspers published an analysis of trends in modern society in 1931. In his Vom Ursprung und Sinn der Geschichte, 1948, he devotes the second part to an interpre-tation of the modern world. Both works appeared in English. Similar concern , but of course altogether different in content, with the modern world one finds in Heidegger’s Holzwege 1950 , especially in the essay “Die Zeit des Weltbilds” which in many respects is supplement-ed and corrected in his recent lecture “Die Frage nach der Technik”, in Die Künste im Technischen Zeitalter, Jahrbuch der Bayerischen Akademie der Schönen Künste, 1954.
53
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 16) In his Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, 1784.	🞽 16.  In his Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, 1784.	🞽 16) In his Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicherAbsicht, 1784.
54
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 17) This is the central intention of his philosophy of history and its thesis of an “axis time of world history” which passes through the fifth century B.C. and becomes the origin of all great world civilizations as presented in the work quoted above. Since then, Jaspers has been working on a “world history of philosophy”.	🞽 17.  This is the central intention of his philosophy of history and its thesis of an “axis time of world history” (which passes through the fifth century B.C. and becomes the origin of all great world civilizations) as presented in the work quoted above. Since then, Jaspers has been working on a “world history of philosophy”.	🞽 17) This is the central intention of his philosophy of history and its thesis of an “axis time of world history” which passes through the fifth century B.C. and becomes the origin of all great world civilizations as presented in the work quoted above. Since then, Jaspers has been working on a “world history of philosophy”.
55
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	Weinstein: 1) Trad. Philos.--Nature of the Virtue Political Action & Thought 2) Wise Man: Tell what to do, what freedom is, etc. 3) Re-appearance of Absurdity-- [metamark ———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————] Voegelin: 1) outside a c.: Breakdown of universities Collége Philos. 2) Recovery of Knowledge - - Texts. Orientation of individual: Sartre -- δοξα no philos. at all Results in Concentrationcamps! Sartre & Camus
56
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 17a) “Über meine Philosophie” in Rechenschaft und Ausblick, 1951, p.350ff.	🞽 17a. “Uber meine Philosophie” in Rechenschaft und Ausblick, 1951, p. 350ff.	🞽 17a) “Über meine Philosophie” in Rechenschaft und Ausblick, 1951, p. 350ff.
57
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 17b) The translation is borrowed from Carl J. Friedrich’s Inevitable Peace, 1948.	🞽 17b. The translation is borrowed from Carl J. Friedrich’s Inevitable Peace, 1948.	🞽 17b) The translation is borrowed from Carl J. Friedrich’s Inevitable Peace, 1948.
58
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 18) Op. cit. p. 284	🞽 18.  Op. cit., p. 284	🞽 18)  Op. cit. p. 284
59
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 19) “Ein Blick auf die bisherige Ontologie zeigt, dass mit dem Ver-fehlen der Daseinsverfassung des In-der-Welt-seins ein Überspringen des Phänomens der Weltlichkeit zusammengeht.” Sein und Zeit, p. 65.	🞽 19.  “Ein Blick auf die bisherige Ontologie zeigt, dass mit dem Verfehlen der Daseinsverfassung des In-der-Welt-seins ein Uberspringen des Phänomens der Weltlichkeit zusammengeht.” Sein und Zeit, p. 65.	🞽 19) “Ein Blick auf die bisherige Ontologie zeigt, dass mit dem Ver-fehlen der Daseinsverfassung des In-der-Welt-seins ein Überspringen des Phänomens der Weltlichkeit zusammengeht.” Sein und Zeit, p. 65.
60
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	🞽 20) Thus Nietzsche in Wille zur Macht, No. 291	🞽 20.  Thus Nietzsche in Wille zur Macht, No. 291.	🞽 20) Thus Nietzsche in Wille zur Macht, No. 291
61
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	Meyer 1) Auth. mod. philos.: what question Difference from social sciences 2) Truth - Polit. events. Which questions make sense? 3) Authentic. except as we define it. 4) Philos. & Politics - - stay away from human events. Kant’s three question1 vers. 2 Philos. & Sciences. Ethics: only I-Thou - Values Sermon of the mountain - The meaning of human existence - - [metamark ———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————] Historically conditioned - guide post Political impossibility -
62
[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	[keine Entsprechung vorhanden]	cmvnbvgfhdjskl;c mcnvbhfgryueiwoqp2-30495867/c;slxdfjqwpeoituy½5